Conduct of a Spouse That Dissipates Property Available for Equitable Property Distribution: A Suggested Analysis by Becker, Lewis
Conduct of a Spouse That Dissipates Property
Available for Equitable Property Distribution: A
Suggested Analysis
LEWIS BECKER*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 95
II. ANALYSES EMPLOYED IN COMMON LAW STATES ............. 97
A. The Dissipation Doctrine ............................ 97
1. Funds Subject to the Doctrine ................... 104
2. Essential Scope of the Doctrine .................. 105
3. Expenditures and Conduct Constituting Dissipation . 111
4. Relevance of Consent or Acquiescence ............. 116
5. Burden of Proof ............................... 117
B. The "Marital Property" Analysis .................... 118
III. THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY MODEL ...................... 120
IV. THE UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT MODEL ............ 124
V. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS ................................... 125
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................... 132
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial increase has occurred recently in the number of cases where,
in an equitable distribution proceeding1 in a noncommunity property (or "com-
* Professor of Law. Villanova University. I wish to thank my colleague, Professor Doris Brogan, for reading
the manuscript of this article and for discussing it with me. I also wish to acknowledge the research assistance of
Tracey Salmon.
I. The hallmark of an equitable distribution system is the court's power to distribute between the spouses, in
equitable or just proportions and in accordance with statutorily prescribed factors, property that is subject to the
statute regardless of which spouse acquired or has record title to the property. For a general overview of statutory
provisions regarding equitable distribution, see Becker, Overview of Statutes Governing Properly Distribution, in
I VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY §§ 3.01-3.15 (J. MeCahey ed. 1990).
All noncommunity property (or "common law") jurisdictions authorize some form of equitable property dis-
tribution upon divorce. See ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(4) (Supp. 1989); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 9-12-315(a)(I)(A) (Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(l) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-
81(a) (1986); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(b) (1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.075(l) (West Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47(a) (Supp. 1989); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, para.
503(d) (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE § 598.21(I) (Supp. 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(1) (Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(I) (1981); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205(a) (Supp. 1990);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 34 (Supp. 1990); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 552.23(1) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 subd. I
(1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452,330 sec. I (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1989); NEE.
REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.16-a(II) (Supp. No. 2 1989); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-
23 (Supp. 1990): N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 236B(5)(a) (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a) (1987); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(B) (Anderson Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit.
43. § 121 (Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(l)(f) (1990); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon
Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a) (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(a) (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-5(I) (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751(a) (1988); VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-107.3(C)-(D) (1990); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-32(c) (1986); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1987).
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mon law") jurisdiction,2 one spouse contends that the other spouse has previ-
ously consumed,3 given away" or otherwise transferred, 5 mismanaged,6 con-
verted,7 or otherwise adversely affected 8 property that, had it been before the
court, would have been subject to equitable distribution.
These cases pose a variety of difficult issues regarding the extent to which a
court in an equitable distribution proceeding should be able to protect a spouse
from conduct of the other spouse which affected property prior to the institution
of divorce litigation. For example, assume that in a state where property ac-
quired by either spouse prior to the entry of a divorce is subject to equitable
distribution,9 a spouse during separation uses funds she earned during the sepa-
ration to pay for furnishings for her apartment or for an expensive vacation in
Switzerland. Is the amount of money that was expended in any way relevant in
the equitable distribution proceeding? Or, assume that prior to separation a
spouse spends five thousand dollars of his earnings in entertaining a paramour.
Is that expenditure at all relevant in an equitable distribution proceeding? Does
it make a difference if the funds spent were taken from a joint bank account
rather than from the earnings of the spouse? Does it matter if, instead of the
funds being spent on a paramour, they were expended, without the knowledge
See also WIs. STAT. § 767.255 (1987). Wisconsin has adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA),
and therefore for some purposes may be classified as a community property state. See infra note 124. However,
the UMPA is silent as to divorce, and hence the above statute, which predates the adoption of the UMPA and
which authorizes equitable distribution, continues to govern divorce actions. See infra note 132.
In Georgia, the statutory authority for equitable distribution is not explicit, but the existence of an equitable
distribution system is well established. See, e.g., Stokes v. Stokes, 246 Ga. 765, 771, 273 S.E.2d 169, 173 (1980).
In Mississippi, there is no particular statutory base for equitable distribution, but the courts nonetheless permit a
limited form of equitable division of property in connection with divorce. See Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574, 580
(Miss. 1988).
2. In a noncommunity property system, each spouse is free during the marriage to acquire and to own prop-
erty to the exclusion of any ownership interest of the other spouse. For example, if one spouse purchases stock
during marriage with her earnings and takes title to the purchased stock in her name alone, that spouse is the sole
owner of the stock; the other spouse gains no ownership interest by reason of the marriage in property acquired by
the other. In this respect a common law system differs markedly from a community property system; community
property systems are discussed in more detail infra at text accompanying notes 105-23.
3. E.g., In re Marriage of Partyka, 158 Ill. App. 3d 545, 552, 511 N.E.2d 676, 682 (1987) (money spent on
household furnishings during spouses' separation, discussed infra at note 67 and accompanying text); Barriger v.
Barriger, 514 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ky. 1974) (money spent on, inter alia, gambling and entertainment, discussed
infra at note 70 and accompanying text); Willis v. Willis, 107 A.D.2d 867, 868, 484 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (1985)
(money spent on flying and snowmobiling hobbies, discussed infra at note 72 and accompanying text).
4. E.g., Ahlo v. Ahlo, I Haw. App. 324, 329, 619 P.2d 112, 117 (1980) (irrevocable transfer of funds to the
parties' children); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 502-03, 497 A.2d 485, 492-93 (1985), cert. denied.
305 Md. 107, 501 A.2d 845 (1985) (gift by husband to woman friend). See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
5. E.g., S.L.J. v. R.J., 778 S.W.2d 239, 244-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. R.J. v. Kahn,
110 S. Ct. 1823 (1990) (money used by husband to repay a debt to his father, discussed infra at note 85 and
accompanying text).
6. See infra decisions discussed at note 64 and accompanying text.
7. E.g., Hogrebe v. Hogrebe, 727 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
8. E.g., In re Marriage of Siegel, 123 II1. App. 3d 710, 718-20, 463 N.E.2d 773, 780-81 (1984) (spouse's
failure to pay mortgage payments, resulting in a loss of equity, discussed infra at note 62 and accompanying text);
Gruver v. Gruver, 372 Pa. Super. 194, 200, 539 A.2d 395, 398 (1988), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 605, 553 A.2d 968
(1988) (refusal to sign joint tax return, discussed infra at note 63 and accompanying text).
9. Common law states vary as to the date after which property acquired by a spouse is no longer subject to
equitable distribution. For example, property acquired by a spouse after the final separation of the parties is not
subject to equitable distribution in some common law states, but is subject to equitable distribution in others. For
a further discussion of statutory variations as to cut off dates, see infra note 42.
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and consent of the other spouse, for nursing home care of the spending spouse's
mother? What if the funds were given as a gift by the spouse to the spouse's
child by a previous marriage? Does it matter if, in any of the above hypotheti-
cals, the nonspending spouse was aware of the expenditures in advance, or sub-
sequently became aware of the expenditures and did not protest?
Courts in common law states have developed various inconsistent or incom-
plete analytical frameworks for dealing with these types of problems. Issues re-
garding the correct analytical framework are important, and raise significant
policy concerns. On the one hand, equitable distribution proceedings must be
able to protect a spouse against inappropriate conduct by the other spouse that
reduces the amount of property available for equitable distribution and that
thereby adversely affects the property rights of the first spouse. This need for
protection militates in favor of a system that extends the broadest possible pro-
tection. On the other hand, however, a set of rules designed to afford the
broadest possible protection against inappropriate expenditures or conduct may
unduly restrict the freedom of a spouse to deal with the spouse's own property
and, therefore, conflict with general notions of the rights of a property owner in
a common law system. Moreover, a set of rules designed to afford protection by
permitting one spouse to question in a divorce proceeding, when parties have
considerable rancor against each other, prior expenditures made by the other
spouse may create too great a risk of perjury and unfounded accusations that
would be difficult to rebut.
This article will first discuss existing analytical frameworks that exist in
common law jurisdictions for dealing with this issue. The article will then dis-
cuss analytical frameworks in community property states and under the Uni-
form Marital Property Act and compare them to common law jurisdictions. The
article will then present a suggested analysis.
II. ANALYSES EMPLOYED IN COMMON LAW STATES
A. The Dissipation Doctrine
One analytical approach that a number of common law states have devel-
oped to apply to the wrongful depletion problem is the dissipation doctrine.
Under this doctrine, where a spouse has engaged in conduct that has dissipated
(i.e., diminished) the value of the marital estate,10 a court in an equitable distri-
bution proceeding may consider the dissipation as a factor in dividing the prop-
10. The precise type of expenditures and conduct that constitute dissipation will be discussed infra. See text
accompanying notes 60-85. A few decisions have used the equivalent of a dictionary definition of the term "dis-
sipation." For examples utilizing the Black's Law Dictionary definition of dissipation as the wasting or expending
of funds foolishly, see In re Marriage of Getautas, 189 II1. App. 3d 148, 155, 544 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (1989) and
Volesky v. Volesky, 412 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). The great majority of the decisions on dissipa-
tion have not specifically adopted any such limited definition. See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 455 n.3,
752 P.2d 1038, 1041 n.3 (1988) ("The word 'dissipation' . . . is not used in its usual limited sense. The word is
used as a general term which includes excessive or abnormal expenditures, [and] destruction, concealment, or
fraudulent disposition of. . . property .... "). See also E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688, 695 (Del. 1983), refer-
ring to the definitions in Black's Law Dictionary and the American Heritage Dictionary but concluding that the
Delaware statute uses the term "dissipation" as the antonym for other statutory language requiring the court to
consider, in making equitable distribution, the contribution of each party to the acquisition and preservation of
1991]
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erty that remains,"' or it may make an offset for the dissipated property by
considering the property as still being available for distribution, awarding the
dissipated property to the dissipating spouse, and awarding a corresponding
amount of property to the other spouse.12 In a few instances, a court has
marital property. As will be discussed later, the dissipation doctrine has been applied to a wide range of
expenditures.
II. See, e.g., E.E.C., 457 A.2d at 695-97; In re Marriage of Petrovich, 154 I1l. App. 3d 881, 887, 507 N.E.2d
207, 211 (1987), appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d 556, 515 N.E.2d 125 (1987); Lenczycki v. Lenczycki, 152 A.D.2d
621, 624, 543 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (1989); Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 88, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985); Booth v.
Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 27-28, 371 S.E.2d 569, 573 (1988).
12. For example, if at the time of the equitable distribution hearing there exists $100,000 of marital prop-
erty, and a spouse has previously dissipated $100,000 by gambling losses, the court could, if it determines that a
50% split is otherwise appropriate, award the dissipating spouse the $100,000 that has been previously dissipated
and award the nondissipating spouse the existing $100,000. See, e.g., Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 643
(Alaska 1989); In re Marriage of Jones, 187 III. App. 3d 206, 222-24, 543 N.E.2d 119, 137 (1989); In re Mar-
riage of Partyka, 158 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550, 511 N.E.2d 676, 680 (1987); Lynch v. Lynch, 411 N.W.2d 263, 266
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Hogrebe v. Hogrebe, 727 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Greco v. Greco, 73 Wis.
2d 220, 228, 243 N.W.2d 465, 470 (1976). A court could not both make an offset and consider dissipation as a
factor in awarding the remaining assets. See Hartland, 777 P.2d at 643.
So far as the author is aware, no decision has held that a court does not have the power to make this kind of
offset. (Whether a court may make a compensatory award of assets that do not exist at the time of the award is a
different question, discussed infra at note 13 and accompanying text.) It might be argued that where the dissipa-
tion doctrine is founded on a statutory provision which permits a court to consider dissipation as a factor in
dividing existing marital property (see infra note 14), then dissipation may only be considered as a factor and a
court does not possess any power to make an offset award. However, such a contention seems invalid; no real
difference exists between a decree that considers the dissipation of one spouse as a factor and awards the other
spouse a very large percentage of the marital estate, and a decree that offsets against one spouse's share the
amount that was dissipated by that spouse. In either case, the nondissipating spouse receives a larger percentage
of the marital estate remaining after the dissipation. It is possible that under some circumstances the use of an
offset approach could constitute an abuse of discretion. For example, it might constitute an abuse of discretion if a
trial court were to make an award offsetting dissipated funds while refusing to consider the applicability of other
factors statutorily mandated to be considered in making equitable distribution. It might be useful if a jurisdiction
required that a court utilizing the offset approach specify why that approach is being used, as opposed to simply
considering the dissipation as a factor.
Note that some decisions, without using the word "dissipation," permit a court in an equitable distribution
proceeding to make a direct offset to a spouse to compensate or reimburse the spouse for the actions of the other
spouse in appropriating marital property. These cases thus reach the same result as the decisions referred to in the
first paragraph of this footnote. See. e.g., Ahlo v. Ahle, I Haw. App. 324, 329, 619 P.2d 112, 117 (1980); In re
Marriage of Paulsen, 677 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); S.L.J. v. R.J., 778 S.W.2d 239, 244-45 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied sub noam. R.J. v. Kahn, 110 S. Ct. 1823 (1990); In re Marriage of Hunter, 196 Mont.
235, 242, 639 P.2d 489, 492-93 (1982). For purposes of analysis, this article generally attempts to distinguish
between decisions that utilize the term "dissipation" and thus may be said to employ a "dissipation doctrine," and
decisions that do not use the term. Decisions that do not use the term "dissipation" are generally characterized in
this article as employing a "marital property" approach. See infra text accompanying notes 94-104. As is devel-
oped infra, there is often no difference in result between these two categories of decisions insofar as determining
whether a particular type of expenditure or conduct is appropriate. Rather, the essential difference is that jurisdic-
tions that follow the marital property approach seem to have developed an even less satisfactory analytical struc-
ture than jurisdictions that follow the dissipation doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 10 1-04. However,
attempts to classify a decision into one of the two categories can pose problems. For example, there is a string of
Missouri cases that do not use the term "dissipation" but that hold that one spouse can be reimbursed when the
other spouse "squanders" property subject to equitable distribution. E.g., Heins v. Heins, 783 S.W.2d 481, 484-85
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990); S.L.J. v. R.J., 778 S.W.2d 239, 244-45 (Me. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. R.J. v.
Kahn, t10 S. Ct. 1823 (1990); Nedblake v. Nedblake, 682 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Bland v.
Bland, 652 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Calia v. Calia, 624 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
However, at least two other Missouri decisions do use the term "dissipation." Hogrebe v. Hogrebe, 727 S.W.2d
193, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 292, 295-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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awarded a compensatory monetary judgment against the dissipating spouse.'3
The dissipation doctrine has various sources. Some state statutes specifi-
cally provide that dissipating conduct is a factor to be considered in determining
what is an equitable or just distribution."' Other states use equivalent language
that establishes as a factor conduct that diminishes the value or amount of mar-
ital property.' 5 In either case, the statutory provisions are generally explicitly or
13. The entry of a compensatory monetary judgment seems most appropriate, but also most controversial,
when sufficient assets do not exist to compensate for the dissipated property. See A.I.D. v. P.M.D., 408 A.2d 940,
943 (Del. 1979). See also Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 457-58, 752 P.2d 1038, 1044 (1988) (court in a
dissolution proceeding may award to a spouse a sum of money representing the value of an interest in community
property not available for equitable division because of dissipation by the other spouse); In re Reinberg, 16 Fam.
L. Rptr. (B.N.A.) 1428-29 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990). Cf. In re Marriage of Aslaksen, 148 II1. App. 3d 784, 787, 789,
500 N.E.2d 91, 93, 95 (1986) (sustaining trial court's award of the balance of marital assets in the form of
periodic maintenance payments over a five-year period); Harrell v. Harrell, 120 A.D.2d 565, 565-66, 502
N.Y.S.2d 57, 58-59 (1986) (trial court erred in refusing to consider making an equitable distribution to spouse of
funds that had been dissipated by other spouse on ground that property was not in possession of other spouse). But
for examples of courts holding that a court may not enter an award that exceeds the amount of the marital estate,
see In re Marriage of McManama, 272 Ind. 483, 486-87, 399 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1980); Armstrong v. Armstrong,
181 Ind. App. 343, 346-47, 391 N.E.2d 855, 857 (1979); In re Marriage of Lippert, 627 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Mont.
1981).
A recent Ohio statutory provision provides that where a spouse has engaged in "financial misconduct, includ-
ing but not limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of assets," the court may
make a "distributive award." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(E)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1990). A "distributive
award" is an award payable in a lump sum or over time and made from separate property or income. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
14. Equitable distribution statutes often require that a court consider statutorily prescribed factors in deter-
mining how to divide property between the spouses. See generally Becker, supra note 1, § 3.08.
For statutory provisions specifically listing dissipation as a factor, see DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(6)
(1981) ("The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or apprecia-
tion of the marital property"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(b) (1989) ("each party's contribution to the acquisition,
preservation, appreciation, dissipation or depreciation in value of the assets subject to distribution"); ILL REV.
STAT, ch. 40, para. 503(d)(1) (Supp. 1990) ("the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition,
preservation, or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and nonmarital property"); IND. CODE § 31-
1-I 1.5-1 1(c)(4) (Supp. 1990) ("the conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or
dissipation of their property"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 1989) ("dissipation of assets");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1989) ("the contribution or dissipation of value of the respective estates"); NJ.
STAT. § 2A:34-23.1(i) (Supp. 1990) ("The contribution of each party to the acquisition, dissipation, preservation,
depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property"); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW §
236B(5)(d)(l I) (MeKinney 1986) ("the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse"); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 401 (d)(7) (Purdon Supp. 1990) ("The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preser-
vation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(c)(5) (Supp. 1990)
("The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation or dissipation of the marital or
separate property"); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32(c)(4) (1986) ("The extent to which each party, during the marriage,
may have conducted himself or herself so as to dissipate or depreciate the value of the marital property of the
parties: Provided, That except for a consideration of the economic consequences of conduct as provided for in this
subdivision, fault or marital misconduct shall not be considered by the court in determining the proper distribution
of marital property.").
Cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(E)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1990) ("If a spouse has engaged in financial
misconduct, including but not limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of
assets, the court may compensate the offended spouse with a distributive award or with a greater award of marital
property.").
15. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 subd. 1 (1990) ("the contribution of each in the acquisition, preserva-
tion, depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458.16-a(ll)(f) (Supp. No. 2 1989) ("The actions of either party during the marriage which contributed to the
growth or diminution in value of property owned by either or both of the parties"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(c)(Il a) (1987) ("Acts of either party. . . to waste, neglect, devalue or convert such marital property, during
the period after separation of the parties and before the time of distribution"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
751(b)(I I) (1989) ("the contribution of each spouse in the acquisition, preservation, and depreciation or apprecia-
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implicitly mandatory-i.e., refusal to consider a statutory factor is an abuse of
discretion.16 Even in the absence of explicit statutory provisions, courts have
held that dissipating conduct was encompassed by other specifically listed statu-
tory factors17 or by statutory "catch all" language.1 ' Some decisions have per-
mitted the consideration of dissipation of assets without relying upon a specific
statutory base.'"
Whatever its basis, the dissipation doctrine is sound public policy. Equita-
ble distribution statutes were enacted to alleviate inequities that previously ex-
isted in common law states in connection with the economic consequences of
divorce. Prior to equitable distribution, a court in a divorce action had no power
to award to one spouse a share in property owned solely by the other spouse.
Thus, prior to the advent of equitable distribution, a wage-earning or income-
producing spouse was able to acquire property solely in his name, and then upon
divorce be entitled to sole possession of such property, notwithstanding the
tion in value of the respective estates"). Cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.16-a(Il)(I) (Supp. No. 2 1989) (court
may consider the fault of a party if the fault caused the breakdown of the marriage and caused substantial
physical or mental pain and suffering or resulted in substantial economic loss); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472(2)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (court must consider marital misconduct or fault, whether or not used as the basis for
the divorce as such, if it affects the economic circumstances of the parties or contributed to the breakup of the
marriage, provided that no conduct shall be considered if it occurred after the earliest of the entry of a pendente
lite order, formal signing of a written settlement agreement, or entry of a permanent order of support).
16. Thus, statutes often provide that a court "shall consider" the statutory factors. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §
16-910(b) (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(1) (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 subd. 1 (1990); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1989); N.J. REV. ANN. § 2A:34-23.1(i) (Supp. 1990); N.Y. DOm. REL LAW §
236B(5)(d)(ll) (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(lla) (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3105.171(F) (Anderson Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a) (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(c)(5)
(Supp. 1990). Moreover, judicial decisions often hold that consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory.
E.g., Wilen v. Wilen, 61 Md. App. 337, 355, 486 A.2d 775, 784 (1985); Binkley v. Binkley, 725 S.W.2d 910, 912
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Zipf v. Zipf, 8 Va. App. 387, 392, 382 S.E.2d 263, 266 (1989). With specific respect to
dissipation as a factor, see In re Marriage of Merry, 213 Mont. 141, 153, 689 P.2d 1250, 1256 (1984) (pursuant
to statute "court must consider any dissipation of an estate by one party").
17. It has been held that dissipation can be considered under a statutory directive to consider as a factor the
"contribution" of a spouse to the acquisition of marital property or to the marriage. See Booth v. Booth, 7 Va.
App. 22, 28, 371 S.E.2d 569, 572-73 (1988); Anstutz v. Anstutz, 112 Wis. 2d 10, 12-13, 331 N.W.2d 844, 846
(1983). In Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 641, 643 (Alaska 1989), dissipation was held encompassed within
the judicially developed factor of the "duration and conduct of each [party] during the marriage."
18. Some statutes contain a specific "catch all" provision, and others specifically permit, or are construed to
permit, a court to consider relevant factors in addition to those that are statutorily prescribed. See generally
Becker, supra note 1, § 3.08[2]. Courts have held dissipation to constitute an additional relevant factor. See In re
Marriage of Paulsen, 677 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (depletion of assets permitted to be considered
as a "relevant" factor in view of the statutory language that the court "consider[] 'all relevant factors,' including"
the specifically listed ones). Dissipation has also been held relevant under statutory catch all provisions. See Booth,
7 Va. App. at 28, 371 S.E.2d at 573 (dissipation may be considered in view of statutory catch all provision
permitting a court to consider such other factors as the court deems "necessary or appropriate" to consider);
Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 87-88, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985) (conduct which dissipates marital property for
nonmarital purposes may be considered under statutory catch all provision permitting court to consider any other
factor which the court finds to be "just and proper") (decided prior to the effective date of a statutory amendment
which added as an additional statutory factor the conduct of a party in wasting marital property after the separa-
tion of the parties).
19. See Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md.
App. 487, 502, 497 A.2d 485, 492 (1985). cert. denied, 305 Md. 107, 501 A.2d 845 (1985); Sharp v. Sharp, 58
Md. App. 386, 399, 473 A.2d 499, 505, cert. denied, 300 Md. 795, 481 A.2d 240 (1984); Hogrebe v. Hogrebe,
727 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 292, 295-96 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979). But cf. Kaye v. Kaye, 538 A.2d 288, 289 (Me. 1988) (specifically refusing to rule on whether a court can
consider improper diminution of marital assets in making equitable distribution).
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length of the marriage or the nonmonetary contributions of the other spouse.
Equitable distribution statutes were adopted to correct this situation, 0 and deci-
sions frequently have stated that the purpose of equitable distribution is to dis-
tribute to each spouse a share of the assets accumulated through the efforts of
the spouses as partners in the marital enterprise.21 Given that the primary pur-
pose of equitable distribution is to achieve a fairer system of property distribu-
tion upon divorce, an equitable distribution system must permit a court to pro-
tect a spouse against transactions by the other spouse that adversely affect the
interest of the non-active spouse in property subject to equitable distribution.
The dissipation doctrine, whether broadly or narrowly defined, 22 generally
achieves that result.
The dissipation doctrine should not be confused with rules regarding the
effect of fault or marital misconduct of a spouse. Jurisdictions differ as to
whether fault or marital misconduct of a spouse may be considered as a factor
in making equitable distribution. A number of states statutorily provide that
marital misconduct is a factor to be considered in making equitable distribu-
tion,23 and others have judicially adopted rules that permit consideration of at
20. See, e.g., Hofmann v. Hofmann, 94 111. 2d 205, 222, 446 N.E.2d 499, 505 (1983); McLean v. McLean,
323 N.C. 543, 549, 374 S.E.2d 376, 380 (1988); Mauser v. Mauser, 75 N.C. App. 115, 119, 330 S.E.2d 63, 65
(1985).
21. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 369-70, 474 N.E.2d 1137, 1142-43 (1985);
Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987); Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J. Super. 281, 287, 543 A.2d
1062, 1065 (App. Div. 1988), cert. denied, 114 N.J. 287, 554 A.2d 844 (1988); McLean, 323 N.C. at 549, 374
S.E.2d at 380; Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St. 2d 318, 319-20, 432 N.E.2d 183, 184 (1982).
On the other hand, equitable distribution should not be viewed as being concerned, in every state, exclusively
with the property owned by the parties and how that property was acquired. Some of the factors that are man-
dated by statute have a lot more to do with general equitable concerns than with the role of the spouses in the
acquisition of property. For example, in some states consideration of the fault or marital misconduct of a party
may be required. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. As another example, the need or economic cir-
cumstances of a party is a commonly listed statutory factor. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-12-315(a)(1)(A)(vii)
(Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-t0-113(l)(c) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1986); DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(8) (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(b) (1989); FLA. STAT. § 61.075(i)(b) (Supp. 1990);
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, pars. 503(d)(4) (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-I-I 1.5-1 1(c)(3) (Supp. 1990); IOWA
CODE § 598.21(l)(i) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1)(d) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(1)(C) (1981); MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205(a)(3) (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 208, § 34 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 subd. 1 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 Sec. I (Supp. 1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(l) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.16-a(ll)(b) (Supp. No. 2 1989); NJ. REV.
STAT. § 2A:34-23.1(f) (Supp. 1990); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d)(10) (Purdon Supp. 1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(c)(8) (Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. § 767.255(b) (1987).
22. The definitions of the doctrine are discussed infra at notes 39-59 and accompanying text.
23. Thus, some statutes include the causes of divorce as a factor. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1986)
("the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage, or legal separation"); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-
205(a)(4) (1990) ("the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties"); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458.16-a(i1)(1) (Supp. No. 2 1989) ("the fault of either party. . . if said fault caused the breakdown of
the marriage and (1) [c]aused substantial physical or mental pain and suffering or (2) [r]esulted in substantial
economic loss to the marital estate or the injured party"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989) ("marital misconduct or fault. . . whether or not used as the basis for a divorce as such, if the misconduct
.. . affected the economic circumstances of the parties or contributed to the breakup of the marriage"); VA.
CODE. ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(5) (1990) ("[t]he circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of
the marriage").
At least three statutes list as a factor the conduct of the parties during the marriage, without any further
specificity. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 34 (Supp. 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 Sec. 1(4) (Supp. 1990); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a) (1988).
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least some degree of fault or marital misconduct.24 In other states, however,
marital misconduct that does not have economic repercussions is not a permissi-
ble factor. Thus, some statutes specifically provide that in making equitable dis-
tribution the court shall not consider the fault or marital misconduct of a
party,"5 and in the absence of any statutory provision some judicial decisions
preclude consideration of fault on various policy rationales.26
However, even where state law precludes consideration of fault or marital
misconduct, evidence of conduct that has dissipated marital assets should not be
excluded. Dissipating conduct is not equivalent to fault or marital misconduct.
Unlike evidence of fault or marital misconduct, evidence of dissipation is di-
However, even where a statute permits a court to consider fault as a factor, judicial decisions may curb the
relevance of or the weight to be accorded to fault. For example, some Missouri cases have adopted a restrictive
rule notwithstanding the breadth of the statutory language. See, e.g., Burtscher v. Burtscher, 563 S.W.2d 526,
527-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (the factor of conduct during the marriage becomes important when the conduct of
one party throws upon the other party marital burdens beyond the norms to be expected during a marital relation-
ship; spouse's adulterous relationship, if any, occurred during only a small portion of a 24-year marriage and
imposed no particular burdens on the other spouse); Divine v. Divine, 752 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(sexual infidelity after separation did not place any extra burden on the partnership endeavor); Mastin v. Mastin,
709 S.W.2d 545, 547, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (husband's conduct did place more than normal burdens on wife
in that, inter alia, she was required to change her lifestyle and was physically injured (apparently by contracting
veneral disease from her husband)).
See also Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. App. I, 5-6, 371 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1988), in which the court stated that
circumstances that have no effect upon the marital property are not relevant to determining a monetary award,
but where the trial court had considered fault that was apparently not related to the marital property and where
the issue on appeal was whether the wife was entitled to introduce additional evidence of misconduct. Cf. Williams
v. Williams, 297 S.C. 208, 211, 375 S.E.2d 349, 351 (Ct. App. 1988) ("[a]lthough fault does not justify a severe
penalty in the equitable distribution . . . , itis a factor which may be considered").
24. See, e.g., Davey v. Davey, 106 Mich. App. 579, 581, 308 N.W.2d 468, 469 (1981); Behm v. Behm, 427
N.W.2d 332, 337 (N.D. 1988) (marital misconduct is a proper factor, although "some members of this court"
minimize its importance if it does not also involve economic misconduct); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814,
820 (Wyo. 1984) (fault is a proper factor, although such evidence may not be considered by the court to punish
one of the parties). Cf. Sommers v. Sommers, 246 Kan. 652, 657, 792 P.2d 1005, 1010 (1990) ("in all but
extremely gross and rare situations, financial penalties are not to be imposed by a trial court on a party on the
basis of fault"); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589-90, 489 N.E.2d 712, 719, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1985)
(marital fault may not be considered under New York's "catch all" factor, "[e]xcept in egregious cases which
shock the conscience of the court"; marital fault is inconsistent with the underlying assumption that a marriage is
in part an economic partnership and upon its dissolution the parties are entitled to a fair share of the marital
estate, because fault will be difficult to assign and because introduction of the issue will involve the court in time
consuming procedural maneuvers relating to collateral issues); Brancoveanu v. Brancoveanu, 145 A.D.2d 395,
398-99, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90 (1988), appeal dismissed, 73 N.Y.2d 994, 538 N.E.2d 358, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1006
(1988) (egregious conduct found in that one spouse had tried to murder the other).
25. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(4) (Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(l) (1987); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 subd. 1 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-202(l) (1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-
121(a) (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32(c) (1986); WIS. STAT.
§ 767.255 (1987).
26. See, e.g., Boyd v. Boyd, 421 A.2d 1356, 1358 (Me. 1980) (purpose of no fault grounds-to reduce guilt,
bitterness, and conflicts-would be defeated if evidenc relevant to fault could be introduced on the issue of
property distribution); Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 193-94, 320 A.2d 478, 482-83 (1974) ("fault may be
merely the manifestation of a sick marriage" and is not relevant to the basic idea of equitable distribution, which
is that on divorce each spouse should receive his or her fair share of what has been accumulated during the
marriage); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 385, 325 S.E.2d 260, 271 (1985), rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330
S.E.2d 616 (1985) (alimony proceeding, and not equitable distribution proceeding, is the appropriate means for
addressing the economic implications of marital misconduct); Lemon v. Lemon, 42 Ohio App. 3d 142, 145, 537
N.E.2d 246, 250 (1988); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 108 Wis. 2d 189, 202, 321 N.W.2d 237, 244 (1982). Cf. O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985) (discussed supra at note 24).
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rectly relevant to the issue before the court in an equitable distribution hearing,
that is, determining what assets were accumulated during the marriage by the
partners, and how such property is to be divided.2 7 Therefore, even when state
law precludes consideration of fault in an equitable distribution proceeding, a
court should be able to consider evidence of conduct that has dissipated marital
assets.2 8 (Conduct of a spouse in connection with the divorce litigation that in-
creases the attorney's fees of the other spouse is apparently not regarded as
dissipating marital assets.2 9)
Of course, evidence relating to dissipation of marital funds and evidence
relating to marital misconduct are not always easily severable,30 and the possi-
bility therefore exists that a court will use evidence of dissipation of marital
assets as an excuse to impose punishment for offensive conduct where state law
precludes consideration of marital misconduct as such. Notwithstanding this
possibility, the reported cases do not indicate that courts are impermissibly con-
sidering fault under the guise of the dissipation doctrine.3 1
27. It seems generally accepted that the premise of equitable distribution is that marriage is an economic
partnership insofar as the acquisition of property is concerned, and that the purpose of equitable distribution is to
divide between the partners their fair share of the property accumulated. See supra note 21. Decisions or statutes
that preclude evidence of fault seem premised on the conclusion that fault is irrelevant in this process. See, e.g.,
Chalmers, 65 N.J. at 193-94, 320 A.2d at 482-83; Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 291-92, 472 N.Y.S.2d
110. 113 (1984); Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 385, 325 S.E.2d at 271, rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616
(discussed supra note 26). Even those jurisdictions which permit the consideration of fault as a factor often limit
the type of conduct which may be considered. See supra decisions discussed at note 23.
28. It appears that all of the courts that have decided the matter have held that evidence of dissipation of
assets subject to equitable distribution may be considered even though evidence of fault is impermissible. See, e.g.,
Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 642 (Alaska 1989); Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1987); Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d at 293. 472 N.Y.S.2d at 114; Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 87-88, 331 S.E.2d
682. 687 (1985). In this connection, note also that several of the statutes which specifically exclude evidence of
fault specifically provide that dissipation is a factor to be considered. MINN. STAT. § 518.58 subd. I (1990); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(l) (1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-4-121(a), -121(c)(5) (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32(c) (1986).
29. However, in such a situation, the other spouse may be awarded attorney's fees to compensate for the
additional costs caused by such conduct. See Hartland, 777 P.2d at 644; In re Marriage of Cook, 117 i1. App. 3d
844. 854-55, 453 N.E.2d 1357, 1365 (1983); Hogrebe v. Hogrcbe, 727 S.W.2d 193, 194-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
30. For example, one factual situation that contains elements of both dissipation and misconduct is where one
spouse makes a gift of funds that would have been subject to equitable distribution to a third party with whom the
spouse is having an affair. See, e.g., Mika v. Mika, 728 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). See also Sommers
v. Sommers, 246 Kan. 652, 657-58, 792 P.2d 1005, 1010 (1990) (discussing various hypothetical situations involv-
ing both fault which would not be a proper factor to consider and circumstances that would be properly relevant in
making equitable division of property).
3 1. However, the line may be difficult to draw. For example, see Hartland, 777 P.2d at 642 (fault is not a
factor in making equitable distribution; reading the trial court's statements in context indicates that trial court
reduced spouse's share because of his dissipation of marital funds rather than because of his fault). See also
Szesny v. Szesny, 197 Ill. App. 3d 966, 972-73, 557 N.E.2d 222, 226 (1990) (almost all of the parties' consumer
debt of over S82,000 held to have been properly allocated to husband under dissipation theory; record held not to
support husband's contention that division of marital debts was based on his physical mistreatment of his wife,
because trial court "merely mentioned" wife's medical bills for plastic surgery necessitated by facial burns caused
by husband and because trial court properly relied upon, inter alia, husband's "frequent beating of Petitioner
when she questioned him each month when she tried to reconcile the check register with the bank statement"). Cf.
Coleman v. Coleman, 89 N.C. Ct. App. 107, 109-10, 365 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1988) (record below was not clear as
to whether "trial court was considering [husband's] abandonment as marital fault," which would be impermissi-
ble, or economic fault; it can be inferred from findings of fact that trial court considered abandonment only to the
extent that it resulted in a dissipation of the marital home).
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1. Funds Subject to the Doctrine
Judicial decisions in common law states seem to agree in subjecting to the
dissipation doctrine any funds that could have been subject to equitable distri-
bution at the time of an equitable distribution hearing. Thus, the dissipation
doctrine has been applied not only where a spouse has dissipated property
owned jointly by both parties 2 but also where the dissipated property was ac-
quired by and kept in the sole name of the dissipating spouse.33 The application
of the dissipation doctrine to this latter category of funds poses interesting pub-
lic policy questions regarding the ability of a spouse to make an unrestricted use
of his own funds during the marriage. The extent of the restriction will depend
upon state law regarding the scope of the doctrine and the type of expenditures
or conduct constituting dissipation.
The dissipation doctrine may also extend to assets that are not subject to
equitable distribution, often referred to as "nonmarital property." 4 Although
32. See, e.g., Klingberg v. Klingberg, 68 Il1. App. 3d 513, 517, 386 N.E.2d 517, 521 (1979); Hogrebe, 727
S.W.2d at 196-97; Bland v. Bland, 652 S.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Some decisions strongly indi-
cate that the property in question was jointly owned, but do not specifically so state. See. e.g.. Barriger v. Barriger,
514 S.W.2d 114, 114-15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); Lenczycki v. Lenczycki, 152 A.D.2d 621, 624, 543 N.Y.S.2d 724,
727 (1989) (making reference to dissipation of "the family's savings").
33. See, e.g., E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688, 694, 696 (Del. 1983); A.I.D. v. P.M.D., 408 A.2d 940, 941-43
(Del. 1979); In re Marriage of Zimmerman, 200 Ill. App. 3d 594, 596-97, 558 N.E.2d 302, 303 (1990); In re
Marriage of Kaplan, 149 Ill. App. 3d 23, 31-32, 500 N.E.2d 612, 618 (1986); In re Marriage of Smith, 114 Ill.
App. 3d 47, 50-51, 448 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1983); In re Marriage of Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 292, 295-96 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979); Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 519, 521-22 (Minn. 1986); Harrell v. Harrell, 120 A.D.2d 565, 565,
502 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58-59 (1986).
34. State law often characterizes assets that are subject to equitable distribution as "marital" property. As-
sets that are excluded from equitable distribution are usually categorized as "nonmarital" or "separate" property.
Whether assets are subject to equitable distribution varies considerably from state to state. For example, some
statutes exclude from equitable distribution certain types of property, such as property acquired prior to marriage
and property acquired during marriage by gift or inheritance. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(2) (introduc-
tory phrase) and § 14-10-113(2)(a) (1987); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-910(a) (1989); FLA. STAT. § 61.075(3)(b)l,
(3)(b)2 (Supp. 1990); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(a) (introductory phrase) and § 503(a)(1) (Supp. 1990);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(2) (introductory phrase) and § 403.190(2)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1988); Ms. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2) (introductory phrase) and § 722-A(2)(A) (1981); MD. FAM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 8-201(e)(2)(i), (2)(ii) (1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 sec. 2 (introductory phrase) and sec. 2(l)
(Supp. 1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1990); N.Y. DOm. REL LAW § 236B(1)(d)(l) (McKinney
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1987); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(e)(1), (3) (Purdon Supp.
1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a) (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473(1), (2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(b)(2) (Supp. 1990); VA, CODE. ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(i), (ii) (1990); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-1(f)(1), (4) (1986).
However, other statutes do not exclude this type of property from equitable distribution, although case law in
a particular state may protect certain types of property (e.g., property acquired by inheritance) from equitable
distribution. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(a) (1986); HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-47(a)(3) (Supp. 1989);
IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(1) (Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. L. ANN.
ch. 208, § 34 (Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1988); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.16-a(1) (Supp. No. 2, 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. §
107.105(1)(f) (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (1990);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751(a) (1990); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1987).
A few statutes create a middle ground of sorts by establishing prerequisites before there can be equitable
distribution of these classes of property. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(4) (Supp. 1989) (court may divide
only property acquired during coverture, except that the court may invade the property of either spouse acquired
before the marriage when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-12-
315(a)(2) (Supp. 1989) (property acquired prior to marriage "shall be returned to the party who owned it...
unless the court shall make some other division that the court deems equitable"); IowA CODE § 598.21(2) (1981)
(court may divide inherited property or gifts received by one party if refusal to divide the property is inequitable
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there are few decisions on the point,35 some statutes specifically include as an
equitable distribution factor the dissipation of property that is not subject to
equitable distribution.3 There are at least two factual situations in which the
dissipation of such property could be relevant in an equitable distribution hear-
ing. First, a spouse could dissipate his own nonmarital property, and then argue
for a bigger percentage of marital property on the basis of financial need.3 7
Second, a spouse could dissipate the nonmarital assets of the other spouse by,
for example, through forgery, withdrawing money from a nonmarital savings
account owned by the other spouse. Even without any specific statutory authori-
zation to consider dissipation of nonmarital assets, such dissipation should be
relevant.38
2. Essential Scope of the Doctrine
Although the decisions agree that all property subject to equitable distribu-
tion is subject to the dissipation doctrine, they differ substantially as to the es-
sential scope of the doctrine. Thus, some decisions hold that a court may only
consider dissipation that takes place after there has been a breakdown of the
to the other party or to the children of the marriage); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 subd. 2 (1990) (court may award up
to one-half the value of nonmarital property if it finds that either spouse's resources or property are so inadequate
as to work an unfair hardship); Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1987) (property acquired prior to or during the course of
the marriage by gift or inheritance may not be divided unless "refusal to divide such property will create a
hardship on the other party or on the children of the marriage").
In addition to the diversity that exists as to whether property acquired prior to marriage or by gift or inheri-
tance is subject to equitable distribution, state law often varies considerably regarding a cut-off date after which
property acquired by a spouse is no longer subject to equitable distribution. See infra discussion in note 42.
For a general treatment of the various statutory classifications of marital and nonmarital property, see
Becker, supra note 1, §§ 3.03[1], [2].
35. See In re Marriage of Cecil, 202 II1. App. 3d 783, 787, 560 N.E.2d 374, 379 (1990); Stallings v. Stall-
ings, 75 III. App. 3d 96, 100, 393 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (1979) (court cites, as a factor supporting award of all of the
marital property to the wife, that husband had absorbed a substantial amount of the wife's nonmarital estate in
his business ventures).
36. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(d)(1) (Supp. 1990) ("the contribution or dissipation of each party in
the acquisition, preservation, or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and nonmarital property");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(c)(5) (Supp. 1990) ("The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preserva-
tion, appreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property ...").
See also, listing dissipation as a factor and in doing so using language that can be construed as encompassing
dissipation of nonmarital assets, N.Y. Dom. REL LAW § 236B(5)(d)(l 1) (McKinney 1986) ("the wasteful dissipa-
tion of assets by either spouse").
37. See In re Marriage of Cecil, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 791, 560 N.E.2d at 379. The financial status of a party is
often a factor that is required to be considered in making equitable distribution. See supra statutes cited in note
21. But see Centazzo v. Centazzo, 509 A.2d 995, 997 (R.l. 1986) (the needs of a spouse are not to be considered
in making equitable distribution).
38, Such dissipation could fall under a statutory "catch all" provision or could be considered an additional
"relevant" factor, in the same manner as dissipation of marital assets can be considered even though there is no
specific statutory authorization. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
It may be argued, in opposition to the admission of evidence of dissipation of nonmarital assets, that even if a
court has the power to consider additional relevant factors, the dissipation of nonmarital assets is not relevant to
the distribution of existing marital assets. Instead, it may be argued, consideration of such conduct serves only to
punish the dissipating spouse, and is therefore only a form of punishment for fault. Notwithstanding such an
argument, however, dissipation of nonmarital assets is in fact relevant to the present economic position of the
parties and how they got that way. On balance, such conduct seems more relevant than not.
If a statute specifically lists dissipation of marital assets as a factor but is silent as to the dissipation of
nonmarital assets, then it may be argued that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the statute is exclusive on
the subject of dissipation and does not encompass the dissipa;on of nonmarital assets.
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marriage;39 other decisions focus on whether property has been intentionally dis-
sipated in order to defeat the other spouse's equitable distribution rights;40 still
others seem to focus solely on the nature of the expenditure4" and, if the expen-
diture is for a prohibited purpose, find dissipation. Although these different
standards will be discussed individually, at least one significant common theme
unites them: each of these standards restricts to some extent the right of a
spouse to deal as she feels fit with property acquired and owned solely by her.
For example, assume that during the final separation of the parties, a spouse
gambles away, or gives to a paramour, $50,000 of moneys "owned" by her and
acquired after the parties separated and after the marriage had broken down. If
under state law property acquired during a separation is subject to equitable
distribution,42 the conduct of the spouse constitutes dissipation under any of the
three standards set forth above.4" The result would be the same-i.e., the
$50,000 gambled or given away would be subject to the dissipation doctrine-if
the funds were acquired by a spouse prior to marital breakdown but dissipated
after such breakdown.
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that in a common law state a spouse
does not have an ownership interest in property owned solely by the other
spouse,44 the dissipation doctrine extends to a spouse a protectible interest in
39. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
41. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
42. State laws vary considerably regarding a cut-off date after which property acquired by a spouse is no
longer subject to equitable distribution. Thus, in some states, property acquired by a spouse after separation is
subject to equitable distribution and is, therefore, subject to the dissipation doctrine. See. e.g., E.E.C. v. E.J.C.,
457 A.2d 688, 694, 696 (Del. 1983); A.I.D. v. P.M.D., 408 A.2d 940, 941-43 (Del. 1979); In re Marriage of
Kaplan, 149 II1. App. 3d 23, 31-32, 500 N.E.2d 612, 618 (1986); Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 519. 521-22
(Minn. 1986). However, in other states, property acquired by a spouse after the final separation of the parties is
not subject to equitable distribution. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (1987); PA, CONS STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 401(e)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1990); VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(0(5)
(1986). In such states, property acquired after separation is not subject to the dissipation doctrine (unless such
property was acquired with marital assets). For a comprehensive treatment of the various statutory provisions
regarding cut-off dates, see Becker, supra note 1, § 3.03[3].
43. Of the three standards referred to, the only one that arguably might not apply is the standard that speaks
in terms of an intent to deprive the other spouse of property rights. The hypothetical discussed in the text does not
involve such a specific intent. Nevertheless, the equitable distribution decisions that have utilized this standard do
not seem to have required a showing of specific intent and seem to have found dissipation where the conduct in
question merely had the effect of reducing the property rights of the other spouse. See infra decisions cited in note
55.
44. Some statutes provide that each spouse has a species of common ownership of marital property. See, e.g.,
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(e) (Supp. 1990) (interest vests at time that dissolution proceedings are com-
menced); MINN. STAT. § 518.54 subd. 5 (1990) (interest vests not later than date of entry of divorce decree; the
extent of the vested interest is to be determined and made final by the court pursuant to the statute dealing with
equitable distribution); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(3) (1989) (interest vests immediately before date of entry
of dissolution decree); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(k) (1987) (rights vest at the time of separation); OR. REV. STAT §
107.105(1)(f) (1990) (subsequent to filing a petition for dissolution, rights of the parties in the marital assets shall
be a species of co-ownership); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-471 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (during the marriage, a
spouse acquires, based on the factors to be considered in making equitable distribution, a vested special equity and
ownership right in marital property, which rights are subject to apportionment under the equitable distribution
statute at the time marital litigation is commenced).
Whatever the purpose of these statutory provisions, they do not seem to create an interest that protects a
spouse's right to property that has been dissipated by the other spouse. Rather, these provisions seem to have been
designed to avoid the possibility of capital gains taxes on equitable property division that existed under the ruling
in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). Under the Davis ruling, such statutes could have established that
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property owned solely by the other spouse. Of course, the different formulations
of the doctrine offer varying degrees of protection, and the protection is not
available until an equitable distribution hearing. Nevertheless, because the doc-
trine permits sanctions to be imposed upon a spouse for conduct that occurred
prior to the commencement of the divorce action, there is a real tension between
the protection that the dissipation doctrine affords to the non-property owning
spouse and the general right in a common law jurisdiction to do as one wishes
with one's property. The various formulations of the dissipation doctrine permit
a jurisdiction to choose the formulation that in its view best balances these com-
peting interests. A jurisdiction most interested in protecting the right of a
spouse to manage and dispose of her own property may prefer a more narrowly
drawn formulation; a jurisdiction most interested in the protection of a spouse
adversely affected by dissipation may prefer a broader formulation.
As has been indicated above, one formulation of the dissipation doctrine
permits consideration of dissipation only when the dissipation occurs after there
has been some type of marital dysfunction. Thus, in Illinois, dissipation can be
considered only when it takes place at a time when the marriage is undergoing
an irreconcilable breakdown. 45 Virginia intermediate courts have also adopted
equitable property division was a partition of jointly owned property, and hence not subject to capital gains taxes.
The Davis rule was essentially repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1984. See l.R.C. § 1041 (Supp. V 1987). See
also, Auerbach, Jenner, and Feldman, Supplement to Historical and Practice Notes, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 503 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (discussing the Illinois provision and concluding that the provision has been
rendered largely superfluous by the Tax Reform Act).
45. In re Marriage of O'Neill, 138 Ill. 2d 487, 497, 563 N.E.2d 494, 498-99 (1990). The issue in O'Neill was
whether an expenditure of $15,000 for attorney fees to defend the husband against a criminal charge of attempted
rape constituted dissipation. The wife had agreed to the expenditure after the husband told her that he was
innocent of the charge. Subsequent to his conviction, he confessed to his wife that he had in fact committed the
attempted rape. The appellate court had held that any dissipation that takes place during the marriage can be
considered by a court in making equitable distribution. In so holding, the court specifically rejected other appellate
court decisions which held that dissipation can only be considered if it occurred during an irreconcilable break-
down of the marriage. 185 Il. App. 3d 566, 568-69, 541 N.E.2d 828, 830 (1989).
The Supreme Court of Illinois, over the dissent of two justices, reversed, holding that dissipation can be
considered only if it occurred at a time that the marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. The
majority reasoned that the legislature, by not changing the statutory language which permitted a court to consider
dissipation in response to the prior appellate court decisions that had adopted the irreconcilable breakdown re-
quirement, had indicated its intention that the statute be construed to incorporate that requirement. 138 Il1. 2d at
497, 563 N.E.2d at 498.
The dissenting justices were of the view that since the statutory language contained no time constraint, the
statutory language mandated that a court consider dissipation occurring at any time during the marriage and not
merely during the irreconcilable breakdown stage. Id. at 500, 563 N.E.2d at 500 (Stamos, J., dissenting). The
dissent also stated that even if, in spite of the absence of a time constraint, there were still a question as to the
legislative intent, the statutory direction that marital property be divided "in just proportions" mandated consider-
ation of dissipation occurring at any time during the marriage. Id. at 501, 563 N.E.2d at 500 (Stamos, J.,
dissenting).
Although not discussed by either the majority or the dissent, some Illinois authority, even prior to the appel-
late court's decision in O'Neill, seemed inconsistent with a marital breakdown requirement. See In re Marriage of
Kaplan, 149 Ill. App. 3d 23, 32, 500 N.E.2d 612, 618 (1986) (the determinative issue is not the time when the
dissipation occurred but only that the spouse used marital property for his own benefit and for a purpose unrelated
to the marriage at a time when only he had access to the funds). Cf. In re Marriage of Lord, 125 I1. App. 3d 1, 6,
465 N.E.2d 151. 154 (1984) (dissipation found where spouse cashed insurance policies just prior to separation);
Stallings v. Stallings, 75 I1. App. 3d 96, 100, 393 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (1979) (dissipation apparently found where
spouse lost money in bad business dealings during marriage).
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this standard.48 An Alaskan variant of this breakdown test holds that until the
marriage ceases to operate as a financial unit, each party has the right to man-
age and control marital funds, and therefore a court may not consider alleged
dissipation occurring prior to such a time in an equitable distribution proceed-
ing. " In North Carolina, dissipation appears to be relevant only after a separa-
tion of the parties.48
Various policy reasons have been advanced for this requirement. Thus, it
has been argued that without a breakdown test, every expenditure and economic
decision made during the marriage can be questioned, and the courts would
become auditing agencies for every failed marriage. 9 It has also been suggested
that the breakdown test appropriately draws the line between, on the one hand,
the right of a spouse to be protected against improper expenditures by the other
spouse and, on the other hand, the right of a spouse to manage and control
property owned solely by that spouse5 0 However, whatever advantages the test
may afford51 seem greatly outweighed by its disadvantages. First, where the
46. Clements v. Clements, 10 Va. App. 580, 586, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990); Booth v. Booth. 7 Va. App.
22, 27, 371 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1988) (expenditure "in anticipation of divorce or separation for a purpose unrelated
to the marriage and in derogation of the marital relationship at a time when the marriage is in jeopardy"). The
Booth court relied on In re Marriage of Smith, 114 Ill. App. 3d 47, 448 N.E.2d 545 (1983).
47. See Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 802 (Alaska 1989). See also Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 642,
n.6 (Alaska 1989).
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(1 la) (1987) (listing as a factor to be considered in making equitable
distribution, "[a]cts of either party . . . to waste, neglect, devalue or convert such marital property, during the
period after separation of the parties and before the time of distribution").
49. See In re Marriage of Getautas, 189 I1. App. 3d 148, 154, 544 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (1989). In Getautas,
the court also decided that since, under Illinois law, "a person charged with dissipation . . . [must] establish by
clear and specific evidence how the funds were spent," a breakdown standard was necessary to prevent a spouse
from having to keep records of all expenditures from the first day of the marriage. 189 II. App. 3d at 154, 544
N.E.2d at 1288. Getautas, however, was decided prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage
of O'Neill, 138 Il. 487, 563 N.E.2d 494 (1990). The burden of proof in dissipation cases is discussed infra at
notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
Cf. Panhorst v. Panhorst, 301 S.C. 100, 390 S.E.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1990). The Panhorst court held, interpret-
ing a statute, that property allegedly given by a spouse to his mother was not subject to equitable distribution
because the property was not owned by a party when marital litigation commenced. (The court's opinion does not
exclude consideration of dissipation as a factor, but it does exclude distribution of dissipated property not owned
at the time of commencement of litigation.) The court stated:
By requiring the estate to be identified as of the date marital litigation is filed, the Legislature has elected
to foreclose the spouses from litigating every expenditure or transfer of property during the marriage. One
spouse or the other may have spent marital funds foolishly or selfishly or may have invested them unprofit-
ably. The statute wisely prevents the other spouse from resurrecting these transactions at the end of the
marriage to gain an advantage in the equitable distribution. Were it to do otherwise, human greed and
vindictiveness would transform the courts into "auditing agencies for every marriage that falters."
390 S.E.2d at 379.
50. See Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 27-28, 371 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1988), which states, after adopting the
breakdown test:
To allow one spouse to squander marital property is to make an equitable award impossible. .... On the
other hand, at least until the parties contemplate divorce, each is free to spend marital funds. To decide a
question of dissipation of marital assets, we must accommodate these conflicting interests in the marital
estate.
51. The advantages of the test are, arguably, relatively minor. For example, the contention that the marital
breakdown requirement prevents every expenditure from being placed in issue seems hyperbolic-courts can dis-
tinguish between real and false issues and are competent to decide close questions of fact. See, e.g., Cooksey v.
Cooksey, 280 S.C. 347, 351-52, 312 S.E.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1984) (trial court erred in refusing to consider, on
the ground that the parties were living together and had not separated at the time of the transfers, one spouse's
contention that the other spouse had secreted jointly owned marital funds in anticipation of divorce; the very
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standard is couched in the "irreconciliable breakdown of marriage" terminol-
ogy, difficulties arise. Determining after the event whether a marriage was "ir-
reconciliably broken" at the precise time of the dissipating conduct can be a
difficult question, especially considering the separations and reconciliations that
often attend a marriage that is breaking apart.52 This difficulty can be com-
pounded by the fact that in some of these cases it is difficult to know when the
dissipation occurred-all that the injured spouse knows and can prove is that
property disappeared somewhere between two points in time.53 Thus, the burden
of proving that the dissipation occurred subsequent to the matrimonial break-
down may be extremely, and unfairly, difficult in some cases. More importantly,
the marital breakdown and equivalent standards afford unduly narrow protec-
tion to the spouse who is the victim of dissipating conduct by eliminating pro-
tection against dissipation which occurs prior to marital breakdown. Under
these standards, dissipation which takes place prior to marital breakdown is not
remediable in equitable distribution, even where the dissipated property con-
sisted of property jointly owned by both spouses.54
Another formulation of the dissipation doctrine permits a finding of dis-
sipation where property has been intentionally dissipated with a view toward
defeating the other spouse's equitable distribution rights upon divorce. 55  This
purpose of a court is to decide disputed issues of fact). Moreover, the role of consent or acquiescence as a bar
would also prevent every expenditure from being contested. For a discussion of consent, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 87-88 & 160-62.
52. The Illinois decisions adopting the irreconcilable breakdown standard indicate that whether or not an
irreconcilable breakdown existed at the time of the dissipation is a factual question. Thus, it has been held that
breakdown can take place before the commencement of the dissolution action, see In re Marriage of Partyka, 158
Ill. App. 3d 545, 549, 511 N.E.2d 676, 680 (1987); In re Marriage of Smith, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1019, 471
N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (1984), or even prior to a separation of the parties, see In re Marriage of Harding, 189 111.
App. 3d 663, 676, 545 N.E.2d 459, 467 (1989); In re Marriage of Rai, 189 II1. App. 3d 559, 565, 545 N.E.2d
446, 449 (1989); In re Marriage of Hellwig, 100 111. App. 3d 452, 462, 426 N.E.2d 1087, 1094 (1981).
Determining retrospectively whether a marriage was irreconcilably broken down at the time of the dissipating
conduct, considering all of the varying factual circumstances that can characterize a failing marriage including
separations and reconciliations, can be quite difficult. See, e.g., Harding, 189 I11. App. 3d at 676, 545 N.E.2d at
467 ("although trial court suggested ... [that] the irreconciliable breakdown occurred at the point at which [one
spouse] stopped cooking for" the other, there was no evidence of a breakdown until the dissolution action was
commenced); Rai, 189 111. App. 3d at 565, 545 N.E.2d at 450 ("strong evidence was presented that the marriage
began breaking down in 1976," apparently prior to the parties' separation); In re Marriage of Adams, 183 Ill.
App. 3d 296, 303, 538 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (1989) (marital breakdown began when spouse began frequenting
bars).
A standard, such as North Carolina's which requires a separation of the parties before there can be dissipa-
tion does not seem to pose the same difficulties as the marital breakdown standard, as the essential factual ques-
tions are less complicated. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1987).
53. See, e.g., E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688, 694 (Del. 1983); In re Marriage of Petrovich, 154 I1. App. 3d
881, 886-87, 507 N.E.2d 207, 210, appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d 556, 515 N.E.2d 125 (1987); In re Marriage of
Smith, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1022-24, 471 N.E.2d 1008, 1013-15 (1984); In re Marriage of Faulkner, 582
S.W.2d 292, 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
54. For further discussion of the marital breakdown and other standards which define the essential scope of
the dissipation doctrine, see infra Part V. SUoGGESTED ANALYSIS.
55. See, e.g., Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (dissipation consists of
spending funds for a nonmarital purpose when there is a separation or dissolution impending and there is a clear
showing of intent to deprive one spouse of his or her proper share of the marital property); Rosenberg v. Rosen-
berg, 64 Md. App. 487, 502, 497 A.2d 485, 492, cert. denied, 305 Md. 107, 501 A.2d 845 (1985); Sharp v. Sharp,
58 Md. App. 386, 399, 473 A.2d 499, 505, cert. denied, 300 Md. 795, 481 A.2d 240 (1984); Rundell v. Rundell,
423 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Griepp v. Griepp, 381 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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test does not necessarily insulate a spouse's conduct if that conduct occurs prior
to separation or breakdown." However, the key to applying the standard, and
the chief difficulty with the standard, is the definitional issue: What is the
meaning of the requirement that there must be a showing of intent to avoid the
property distribution rights of the other spouse? Intent can be interpreted to
require the showing of specific intent or it can be interpreted to be satisfied with
merely a generalized showing that a spouse intended to engage in a transaction
which had the effect of reducing the other spouse's equitable distribution rights.
If specific intent is required, must the intent be solely to exclude the rights of
the other spouse, or is it sufficient if conduct is only partially motivated by such
conduct? Suppose, for example, that after the final separation of the spouses
one spouse makes a gift or loan to a relative out of property separately owned
by the donor spouse but subject to equitable distribution. Or suppose that prior
to a final separation one spouse uses jointly owned funds to purchase an expen-
sive gift for a paramour or loses a large sum of jointly owned funds in gambling
activities. Must a court, in order for the dissipation doctrine to apply, find a
specific intent to deprive the other spouse of equitable distribution rights in the
event of a divorce? Must the court find that the expending spouse has as his sole
intent to deprive the other spouse of property rights? Such requirements would
greatly weaken the protection afforded by the dissipation doctrine. The few eq-
uitable distribution decisions that have utilized a standard that speaks in terms
of intent have not discussed these issues. Intent to deprive the other spouse of
rights has proven unsatisfactory as a hallmark in an analagous area of domestic
relations law,57 and it is an unsatisfactory model here.
A still different formulation of the dissipation doctrine appears to focus
only on the nature of the expenditure in question, without any other apparent
restriction. Jurisdictions that adopt this formulation impose neither a require-
ment that the transaction be intended to defeat the property rights of the other
56. Since the test focuses on the intent of the actor, conduct motivated by the requisite intent would consti-
tute dissipation, whether or not the parties were separated and whether or not the marriage was irreconcilably
broken at the time of the conduct. Cf. Cooksey v. Cooksey, 280 S.C. 347, 351-52, 312 S.E.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App.
1984) (trial court erred in refusing to consider, on the ground that the parties were living together and had not
separated at the time of the transfers, one spouse's contention that the other spouse had secreted jointly owned
marital funds in anticipation of divorce; dissipation terminology not used in the decision).
57. The analogy is to the law concerning validity of a transfer which deprives a spouse of property rights that
would have existed upon the death of the transferor. Some courts utilized a standard turning on the intent of the
transferor in decisions dealing with this issue. Of these decisions, one study concluded that "the very elusiveness of
the 'intent' concept has led most of the jurisdictions normally using that rationale to adopt a test that in practice
pays more attention to the equities of the case . W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 98
(1960). The same study also concluded:
When the sole criterion is "intent," with no avowed enquiry into the objective manifestations of that
"intent," the test is unsatisfactory .... We are told that "the devil himself knoweth not the mind of
man." The task is even more difficult for the secular observer.
Id. at 117.
Other courts rejected intent of the transferor as the standard and instead used other tests. See, e.g., Newman
v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 378-80, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968 (1937). The problem is now resolved in some jurisdictions by
statutory provisions that, like the Uniform Probate Code, permit a surviving spouse's share of a decedent's estate
to include not only property passing from a decedent by will or intestacy but also property transferred by a
decedent during her lifetime. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201, 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 74-76 (1983). See gener-
ally Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective
Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1977).
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spouse, nor a requirement that the transaction take place after an irreconcilable
breakdown of marriage.58 This approach, by making subject to the dissipation
doctrine any dissipation no matter when it occurs, is the most protective of the
spouse contending dissipation. Arguably, this high degree of protection is war-
ranted in order to best effectuate a significant purpose of equitable distribution:
to recognize and give credit for the role of the spouses in the accumulation of
property over the course of the marriage.59
3. Expenditures and Conduct Constituting Dissipation
Once a jurisdiction determines whether to place any restriction on the es-
sential scope of the dissipation doctrine, courts must define, more precisely than
they have done heretofore, what expenditures and conduct constitute dissipa-
tion. One general definition is that dissipation occurs when one spouse uses
property subject to equitable distribution for his or her own benefit for a pur-
pose unrelated to the marriage.6 0 Although this definition is clear enough to
resolve the garden variety cases that arise dealing with the propriety of particu-
lar expenditures, the definition is too narrowly phrased to resolve many of the
issues that have arisen. In other jurisdictions, the courts have not used any spe-
cific definition to describe the type of expenditure that constitutes dissipation
58. Thus, some courts have utilized a dissipation analysis without indicating any limitation upon the scope of
the dissipation doctrine. See, e.g., Stutz v. Stutz, 556 N.E.2d. 1346, 1349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Because these
decisions do not actually reject (or even discuss) any limitation, they cannot be characterized as unequivocally
representing a dissipation doctrine which does not contain any restrictions on its fundamental scope. Nevertheless,
the existence of a number of such decisions in a particular jurisdiction tends to indicate that the jurisdiction has
adopted an unrestricted formulation. Thus, Missouri decisions have applied either a "dissipation" doctrine or a
similar "reimbursement" concept without indicating any limitation on the scope of those doctrines. See, e.g.,
Missouri decisions cited supra in note 12; Dove v. Dove, 773 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (award by
trial court of a large percentage of marital assets to spouse affirmed "[u]nder these particular facts," which
included facts that "[d]uring the marriage" the other spouse loaned $11,500 to her children which was never
repaid, and withdrew S 14,000 from joint accounts). Similarly, New York and Wisconsin decisions apply a dissipa-
tion analysis without any indication of a limitation on the scope of that analysis. See, e.g., Lenezycki v. Lenczycki,
152 A.D.2d 621, 624, 543 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (1989) (spouse dissipated approximately $135,000 of "the family's
savings" during a three year period); Harrell v. Harrell, 120 A.D.2d 565, 566, 502 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58-59 (1986);
Willis v. Willis, 107 A.D.2d 867, 868, 484 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (1985); Hauge v. Hauge, 145 Wis. 2d 600, 603-05,
427 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (1988); Anstutz v. Anstutz, 112 Wis. 2d 10, 12-13, 331 N.W.2d 844, 846 (1983);
Haack v. Haack, 149 Wis. 2d 243, 253-54, 440 N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied, 443 N.W.2d
310 (1989). Similar decisions exist in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Paulsen, 677 P.2d 1389,
1390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
In this connection, note that statutory provisions that mandate the consideration of dissipation do not, with
the exception of the North Carolina statute, contain any time constraints imposing an irreconcilable breakdown
requirement. See supra statutes cited in notes 14 & 15. Such provisions may ultimately be construed in accor-
dance with their plain language to mandate consideration of dissipation occurring at any time during the
marriage.
59. See supra discussion in note 21 and accompanying text.
60. This definition has been utilized primarily in Illinois. See, e.g., In re Marriage of O'Neill, 138 Ill. 2d 487,
497, 563 N.E.2d 494, 498-99 (1990); In re Marriage of Rai, 189 I11. App. 3d 559, 565, 545 N.E.2d 446, 449
(1989); In re Marriage of Getautas, 189 III. App. 3d 148, 152, 544 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (1989); In re Marriage of
Partyka, 158 III. App. 3d 545, 549, 511 N.E.2d 676, 680 (1987); In re Marriage of Randall, 157 III. App. 3d 892,
897, 510 N.E.2d 1153, 1157, appeal denied, 116 III. 2d 556, 515 N.E.2d 105 (1987).
However, two intermediate Virginia courts also appear to have adopted this definition. See Clements v. Cle-
ments. 10 Va. App. 580, 586, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990); Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 27, 371 S.E.2d 569,
572 (1988).
Cf. Siegel v. Siegel, 241 N.J. Super. 12, 13, 574 A.2d 54, 55 (1990).
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but instead seem to approach the issue of the propriety of an expenditure on an
ad hoc basis.6' The result is often confusion and inconsistency regarding the
various categories of expenditures. For example, there has not been substantial
agreement as to whether dissipation results when a spouse intentionally or negli-
gently acts or fails to act in a way that results in no particular benefit to the
spouse but reduces the value of the marital estate. Thus, although some deci-
sions have held that a failure to make mortgage payments that results in fore-
closure constitutes dissipation,6 2 courts have not agreed as to whether refusal to
sign joint tax returns that results in increased taxes constitutes dissipation,6" nor
have they agreed as to whether the incurrence of losses in business operations
constitutes dissipation." In dealing with these issues, courts have not distin-
guished between intentional and negligent acts, and such a distinction seems
undesirable.6 5
61. See, e.g., Gruver v. Gruver, 372 Pa. Super. 194, 200, 539 A.2d 395, 398, appeal denied, 520 Pa. 605, 553
A.2d 968 (1988) (refusal to sign joint return held to have resulted in dissipation of marital property; no discussion
of authority).
62. In re Marriage of Jones, 187 II1. App. 3d 206, 232-33, 543 N.E.2d 119, 137-38 (1989); In re Marriage of
Aslaksen, 148 III. App. 3d 784, 788-89, 500 N.E.2d 91, 94-95 (1986); In re Marriage of Siegel, 123 I11. App. 3d
710, 719, 463 N.E.2d 773, 780-81 (1984); In re Marriage of Cook, 117 III. App. 3d 844, 853, 453 N.E.2d 1357,
1364-65 (1983). See also, not using the "dissipation" terminology, Heins v. Heins, 783 S.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990).
63. Compare Gruver v. Gruver, 372 Pa. Super. 194, 200, 539 A.2d 395, 398, appeal denied, 520 Pa. 605,
553 A.2d 968 (1988) (refusal to sign joint return held to have resulted in dissipation of marital property; no
discussion of authority) with Hunsinger v. Hunsinger, 381 Pa. Super. 453, 464-65, 554 A.2d 89, 95 (1989)
(spouse not entitled to credit for higher tax payment caused by other spouse's refusal to file joint tax return; term
"dissipation" not used) and Hedelius v. Hedelius, 361 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (contention that
spouse's refusal to cooperate in signing a joint tax return constituted dissipation to the extent of the tax differen-
tial held to be too speculative).
64. Compare In re Marriage of Holt, 97 Or. App. 192, 198, 776 P.2d 7, 10 (1989) (depletion in investment
account because of stock market fluctuations cannot be charged against the spouse who managed the account;
opinion does not use the term "dissipation") and Hauge v. Hauge, 145 Wis. 2d 600, 603-05, 427 N.W.2d 154,
155-56 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) with Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28, 371 S.E.2d 569, 573 (1988) (funds lost in a
speculative venture held by trial court to constitute "waste") and Stallings v. Stallings, 75 Ill. App. 3d 96, 100,
393 N.E.2d 1065, 1067-68 (1979) (seemingly treating as dissipation spouse's loss of other spouse's nonmarital
assets in business misadventures).
See also In re Marriage of Petrovich, 154 I11. App. 3d 881, 886, 507 N.E.2d 207, 209-10 (1987) (dissipation
found where investment account dwindled from $2,000,000 to somewhere between S14,000 and $20,000 at the
time of trial; court states that dissipation need not be for a personal benefit, thus suggesting that spouse's misman-
agement constituted dissipation, but decision can also be read as finding that manager-spouse's explanation for the
disappearance of the account in question was inadequate); In re Marriage of Lippert, 192 Mont. 222, 227-28, 627
P.2d 1206, 1207-09 (1981) (husband left marital home with wife's consent to establish a business for family
elsewhere; after husband left the home he admittedly expended $96,000 in marital assets, which he contended
were lost in a business venture; the supreme court vacated an award to the wife of one-half of the expended
amount, partly on the ground that the trial court had ignored the principle that each spouse had the power to
freely contract with others regarding the marital property, and that even though husband had used poor judgment
in his business transactions he lawfully possessed the power to deal with the property). Lippert was subsequently
explained in In re Marriage of Hunter, 196 Mont. 235, 238-39, 639 P.2d 489, 491 (1982).
65. Few cases have raised the issue. In Anstutz v. Anstutz, 112 Wis. 2d 10, 12-13, 331 N.W.2d 844, 846
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983), the court stated that a party's financial contribution to marriage may be offset by, inter
alia, his negligent or intentional destruction of major assets by fire or by accident. But in In re Marriage of Click,
169 I11. App. 3d 48, 55, 523 N.E.2d 169, 174, appeal denied, 122 III. 2d 571, 530 N.E.2d 241 (1988), in which a
spouse, in violation of a court order, took a motorcycle that was later destroyed in an accident, the court held that
although dissipation can be found where the conduct conferred no personal benefit, dissipation cannot be found
where the conduct was detrimental to both parties and unintentional as well.
It seems undesirable to hold that negligent conduct cannot constitute dissipation. If conduct of one spouse has
a negative impact on the property rights of the other spouse, and if such conduct otherwise constitutes dissipation,
1991] PROPERTY DISSIPATION
Expenditures for various living expenses have also produced some division
in the decisions. Again, an analytical framework that seeks to determine
whether these type of expenditures are for the sole benefit of the expending
spouse is not always helpful in analyzing whether these expenditures should be
subject to the dissipation doctrine. For example, expenditures by a spouse from
funds subject to equitable distribution made for that spouse's reasonable living
expenses arguably involve a personal benefit, but such expenditures are usually
not treated as constituting dissipation,"6 although there is authority to the con-
trary.67 Neither the decisions sustaining or disallowing claims of dissipation ex-
plain their rationale regarding the personal benefit rule. Where decisions apply
the majority rule permitting reasonable living expenses, permissible expenses
encompass expenditures for household items, repairs, automobile or medical in-
surance, and other expenses of everyday living.68 Expenditures which exceed a
normal range may be disallowed.69 There appears to be general agreement that
use of marital funds for gambling or excessive drinking constitutes dissipation
and is not protected by the rule insulating normal living expenses,7 0 and sub-
stantial agreement that the use of marital funds for the payment of legal fees
for services rendered to the expending spouse constitutes dissipation.7 1 Decisions
then it should be considered, whether or not intentional. A defense of lack of intent may encourage perjury and
would unduly weaken the protections supplied by the dissipation doctrine. Cf. note 57 supra and accompanying
text.
66. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Randall, 157 Ill. App. 3d 892, 897, 510 N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (1987); In re
Marriage of Sevon, 117 111. App. 3d 313, 317, 453 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1983); March v. March, 435 N.W.2d 569,
572 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Volesky v. Volesky, 412 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Clements v.
Clements. 10 Va. App. 580, 586, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990); Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28, 371 S.E.2d 569,
573 (1988).
67. See In re Marriage of Harding, 189 Ill. App. 3d 663, 678, 545 N.E.2d 459, 468 (1989) (use of marital
property to secure housing after leaving the marital home constitutes dissipation); In re Marriage of Partyka, 158
Ill. App. 3d 545, 552-54, 511 N.E.2d 676, 682-83 (1987) (spouse's expenditures for, inter alia, rent on his apart-
ment, utilities, and household appliances and furnishings constituted dissipation); Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d
744, 750-52, 229 N.W.2d 629, 632-33 (1975) (spouse charged with expenditures for purchase of automobile and
of furnishings for his apartment).
68. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Getautas, 189 Ill. App. 3d 148, 155, 544 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (1989) (expend-
itures for household items, repairs, and entertainment); Volesky v. Volesky, 412 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (expenditures for support payments, automobile insurance, medical insurance, taxes on land).
69. See. e.g., Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 642 (Alaska 1989); A.I.D. v. P.M.D., 408 A.2d 940, 941-
43 (Del. 1979); Barriger v. Barriger, 514 S.W.2d 114, 114-15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974). Cf. Hogrebe v. Hogrebe, 727
S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (spouse's "reasonable living expenses," as determined by the court, de-
ducted from amount of dissipated funds).
70. As to gambling, see, for example, Smith v. Smith, 114 Ill. App. 3d 47, 51-52, 448 N.E.2d 545, 548
(1983); Barriger, 514 S.W.2d at 115; Anstutz v. Anstutz, 112 Wis. 2d 10, 12-13, 331 N.W.2d 844, 846 (1983).
Cf. Siegel v. Siegel, 241 N.J. Super. 12, 574 A.2d 54 (1990).
There are fewer decisions dealing with excessive drinking than with gambling, but they seem to indicate that
use of marital funds to pay for excessive drinking is not a proper living expense and constitutes dissipation. See
Anstutz, 112 Wis. 2d at 12-13, 331 N.W.2d at 846. See also In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wash. App. 805, 807-
09, 538 P.2d 145, 146-47 (1975); although Washington is a community property jurisdiction, the issue regarding
the propriety of this type of expenditure is the same as in a common law jurisdiction. Cf. In re Marriage of
Adams, 183 III. App. 3d 296, 303, 538 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (1989) (wife alleged that husband misspent on alcohol
a portion of his wages each week; however, no dissipation found since husband testified that the money was spent
on cigarettes, beer, and tips, and since only $4986 to $6086 of his wages were not entirely accounted for over a
two-year period).
71. For holdings that use for payment of legal fees constitutes dissipation, see Head v. Head, 168 Ill. App. 3d
697, 702-03, 523 N.E.2d 17, 21 (1988); In re Marriage of Schriner, 88 II1. App. 3d 380, 385, 410 N.E.2d 572,
576 (1980); Barriger, 514 S.W.2d at 115; Hortis v. Hortis, 367 N.W.2d 633, 636-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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involving the expenditure of funds on expensive hobbies usually have not re-
sulted in a finding of dissipation. 2 One factor tending to militate against a find-
ing of dissipation in such cases is that the other spouse has frequently consented
to the expenditure.73 Courts have disagreed as to whether an expenditure by a
spouse for a trip with the children of the parties constitutes dissipation.74 One
might expect similar disagreement as to whether an expenditure by a spouse for
that spouse's vacation trip alone constitutes dissipation. 71
Although expenditures by one spouse to pay for living expenses for the
other spouse or for the children of the parties do not normally involve a personal
benefit,76 on occasion such expenditures have been held to be impermissible. 77
Decisions which disallow such expenditures may proceed on the premise that,
where the spending spouse has the responsibility for paying for support, use of
funds subject to equitable distribution may confer an inappropriate benefit upon
the spending spouse.7
8
Expenditures for gifts and non-business loans, made from funds that are
subject to equitable distribution without the knowledge or consent of the other
spouse, pose interesting issues. Such expenditures do not confer any benefit
upon the other spouse, and often the recipient of the gift or loan is a child or
other relative of the transferor or is a person who appears to be having a roman-
tic relationship with the transferor. Courts have held that gifts by one spouse to
a third party made from assets subject to equitable distribution constitute dis-
But see Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28-29, 371 S.E.2d 569, 573 (1988) (expenditure of funds for counsel
fees not waste, but use of marital funds to pay excessive counsel fees may be found to constitute waste).
72. See In re Marriage of Reeser, 97 I11. App. 3d 838, 841, 424 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1981); Willis v. Willis, 107
A.D.2d 867, 868, 484 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (1985). Cf. In re Marriage of Stice, 308 Or. 316, 328-29, 779 P.2d
1020, 1027 (1989).
73. See Willis, 107 A.D.2d at 868, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 310. Cf. In re Marriage of Reeser, 97 Il1. App. 3d at
841, 424 N.E.2d at 48 (no testimony that spouse did not enjoy or otherwise participate in the other spouse's racing
hobby). For a discussion of the role of consent or acquiescence, see infra Part V. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS.
74. Compare In re Marriage of Ryman, 172 II1. App. 3d 599, 608, 527 N.E.2d 18, 23-24 (1988) (dissipation
found) with Griepp v. Griepp, 381 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (no dissipation).
75. See Dean v. Dean, 87 Wis. 2d 854, 869, 275 N.W.2d 902, 909 (1979) (trial court may permit expendi-
tures for yearly vacations, although amount expended is subject to review for reasonableness; term "dissipation"
not used).
76. For examples of courts refusing to hold that such expenditures constituted dissipation, see In re Marriage
of Getautas, 189 III. App. 3d 148, 155, 544 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (1989); Griepp, 381 N.W.2d at 869.
77. See, although not using the term "dissipation," Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J. Super. 281, 291, 543 A.2d
1062, 1067 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 114 N.J. 287, 554 A.2d 844 (1988); In re Marriage of Holt, 97 Or. App.
192, 198, 776 P.2d 7, 10 (1989); Grandovic v. Grandovic, 387 Pa. Super. 619, 627-28, 564 A.2d 960, 963-64
(1989).
78. The three decisions cited in note 77 supra seem to support this proposition. In Grandovic, a spouse used
marital assets-investment accounts opened with money that he had received from a lump sum distribution of his
pension-to pay a tax deficiency owed by both spouses and to reimburse himself for college expenses for the
parties' children. 387 Pa. Super. at 625, 564 A.2d at 963. The court held that since the tax debt arose after
separation (and hence under Pennsylvania law was a joint but not a marital obligation), the use of the marital
funds to pay the tax debt conferred a disproportionate benefit upon the payor spouse. Id. at 626-27, 564 A.2d at
963-64. Similarly, the court held that since the payor spouse would have been principally liable for the payment of
the college expenses, the payment of these expenses from marital assets was an impermissible use primarily for his
benefit. Id. at 627-28, 564 A.2d at 964. In both Weiss and In re Marriage of Holt the opinions indicate, but
certainly do not explicitly state, that the payments at issue were made to comply with a previously existing support
order against the expending spouse. Weiss, 226 N.J. Super. at 291, 543 A.2d at 1067; In re Marriage of Holt, 97
Or. App. at 198, 776 P.2d at 10.
[Vol. 52:95
PROPERTY DISSIPATION
sipation, °9 although some decisions are to the contrary.s0 Nonetheless, one may
argue legitimately that a spouse should have the right to make reasonable gifts,
at least from separately owned, although still subject to equitable distribution,
funds.8 A non-business loan (e.g., a non-interest bearing loan to a relative) is in
some respects similar to a gift. However, one key difference between a loan and
a gift is the repayment obligation of the loan. Thus, where a loan is concerned,
the primary question upon equitable distribution is whether to apportion the
repayment obligation between the spouses or whether to simply assign the re-
payment obligation to the lending spouse. In the case of such a loan, it seems
fairest to assign the repayment obligation to the lending spouse as part of that
spouse's share of marital property, 82 because to do otherwise puts the risk of
default upon the other spouse. At least one court has held that the foregone
interest on an interest-free loan represents an amount dissipated.
3
In a factually related area, questions involving dissipation or diminution of
assets occasionally arise in connection with an asserted debt to a relative that is
unpaid at the time of the equitable distribution hearing, or the prior transfer of
funds to a relative in what was assertedly repayment of a debt. Where debts to
a relative are outstanding at the time of the hearing, decisions have allocated
debts incurred for nonmarital purposes as well as debts of a dubious existence
or of a moral rather than a legal obligation to the spouse who incurred the
79. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Zimmerman, 200 Ill. App. 3d 594, 596, 558 N.E.2d 302, 303 (1990); In re
Marriage of Kaplan, 149 Ill. App. 3d 23, 32, 500 N.E.2d 612, 618-19 (1986) (gift to friend of opposite sex);
Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (although gifts to family members can consti-
tute dissipation, in this marriage charity was a marital enterprise in view of evidence of financial assistance to
family members); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 502-03, 497 A.2d 485, 492, cert. denied, 305 Md.
107, 501 A.2d 845 (1985) ("cash advance" to friend of opposite sex). See also, not using the term "dissipation,"
Ahlo v. Ahlo, I Haw. App. 324, 329, 619 P.2d 112, 117 (1980) (spouse irrevocably transferred cash to parties'
adult children); Karr v. Karr, 192 Mont. 388, 407-08, 628 P.2d 267, 278 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982) (funds withdrawn from bank account and placed in a certificate of deposit in names of parties' children).
Cf. Huckabee v. Huckabee, 544 So.2d 170, 172 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (gift transfers to spouse's daughter held
void in view of spouse's testimony that gifts were an attempt to divest other spouse of her interest in these assets).
In Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987), the court adopted the restriction on gifts contained in the
Uniform Marital Property Act. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35.
In some instances, a purported transfer of marital assets may be treated as illusory, with the property remain-
ing subject to equitable distribution. See, e.g., Lynch v. Lynch, 147 Vt. 574, 576-77, 522 A.2d 234, 236 (1987)
(property in a trust created by a spouse who retained a power of revocation held subject to equitable distribution).
In such an event, there is no need for the dissipation doctrine, because the dissipation doctrine only is called into
play if the transfer is in all respects complete and irrevocable.
80. See In re Marriage of Glessner, 119 I1. App. 3d 306, 316, 456 N.E.2d 311, 318 (1983). See also, not
using the term "'dissipation," In re Marriage of Gebhardt, 240 Mont. 165, 174, 783 P.2d 400, 405 (1989); In re
Marriage of McGoldrick, 85 Or. App. 412, 416-17, 736 P.2d 622, 624, rev. denied, 304 Or. 55, 742 P.2d 1186
(1987).
81. See infra Part V. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS.
82. See Willis v. Willis, 107 A.D.2d 867, 868, 484 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (1985) (spouse's transfer of $10,000 to
his son for use as collateral for a loan was properly considered marital property; funds came from father's payroll
savings and after repayment of loan will be returned to him). Cf. Head v. Head, 168 IlI. App. 3d 697, 703, 523
N.E.2d 17, 21 (1988) (transfer of $6,000 to spouse's brother, whether viewed as a gift or a loan, constituted
dissipation).
83. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 503-04, 497 A.2d 485, 493, cert. denied, 305 Md. 107, 501
A.2d 845 (1985).
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debt.8 4 Where funds were previously transferred in what was asserted to be pay-
ment of the debt, courts have used a dissipation or diminution analysis.85
4. Relevance of Consent or Acquiescence
The decisions usually do not discuss the role of consent by the other spouse,
probably because the other spouse rarely seems to have had advance knowledge
of the expenditure in question. Whether consent is a defense is a question more
likely to arise in a jurisdiction which rejects the marital breakdown concept
than in a jurisdiction which accepts the marital breakdown limitation. (In a
jurisdiction which accepts the marital breakdown requirement, only expendi-
tures which occur after breakdown can constitute dissipation. Therefore, in such
a jurisdiction consent can only be an issue if a spouse consents to an expenditure
which takes place subsequent to breakdown. However, in view of the adversary
relationship which often prevails once a marriage has broken down, consent is
far less likely to take place following breakdown.) For analytical purposes, con-
sent may be broken down into express or implied consent given in advance of or
contemporaneously with an expenditure, and acquiescence without protest fol-
lowing an expenditure. Most of the few decisions on the point seem to treat
express or implied consent given in advance of or contemporaneously with an
expenditure as a defense.8  However, at least one decision has indicated that
passive assent or agreement in an expenditure without protest, does not necessa-
84. See Wolter v. Wolter, 395 N.W.2d 417, 421-22 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (involving a nonmarital debt). As
examples of cases involving a claimed debt of dubious existence or of a moral rather than a legal obligation, see In
re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 III. App. 3d 212, 221, 533 N.E.2d 29, 34 (1988); Yackel v. Yackel, 366 N.W.2d 382,
385 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Divine v. Divine, 752 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
85. See In re Marriage of Bauer, 138 I11. App. 3d 379, 388, 485 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (1985) (no dissipation
where marital funds were used to repay funds loaned by the father of one of the spouses, where loan was made for
a marital purpose); In re Marriage of Lord, 125 III. App. 3d 1, 6, 465 N.E.2d 151, 154 (1984) (trial court could
disbelieve spouse's testimony that assets had been used to repay debt to third party, and therefore did not err in
holding that spouse had dissipated assets in question); S.L.J. v. R.J., 778 S.W.2d 239, 244-45 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989), cert. denied sub nom. R.J. v. Kahn, I 10 S. Ct. 1823 (1990) (money assertedly used by husband to repay a
debt to his father held to be distributable as marital property). Cf. In re Marriage of Los, 136 III. App. 3d 26, 30-
31, 482 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (1985) (record supported finding that judgment lien held on marital property by
spouse's parents was fraudulent, and therefore no error in ordering the spouse to repay the loan); Schmeusser v.
Schmeusser, 559 A.2d 1294, 1299 (Del. 1989) (agreement providing that spouse's parents retained a 50% owner-
ship interest in spouse's business held to be a sham designed to shield marital property from the other spouse).
86. See In re Marriage of Aud, 142 Ill. App. 3d 320, 331, 491 N.E.2d 894, 901 (1986) (no dissipation where
spouse acquiesced in payments that other spouse had made for the care of his mother); In re Marriage of Bauer,
138 III. App. 3d 379, 388, 485 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (1985) (no dissipation when marital funds were used to repay
funds loaned by the father of one of the spouses, when loan was made for a marital purpose and when other
spouse had agreed that marital funds were to be used to repay loan); Willis, 107 A.D.2d at 868, 484 N.Y.S.2d at
310. See also, applying a generalized notion of consent, Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1987) (although gifts to family members can constitute dissipation, in this marriage charity was a marital
enterprise in view of evidence of financial assistance to family members; no specific evidence that other spouse
consented to the gifts in question). Cf. In re Marriage of Reeser, 97 Ill. App. 3d 838, 841, 424 N.E.2d 45, 48
(1981) (no testimony that spouse did not enjoy or otherwise participate in the other spouse's racing hobby).
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rily bar a finding of dissipation.8 7 Issues of consent and acquiescence are dis-
cussed in more detail in the Suggested Analysis, infra.8 8
5. Burden of Proof
The dissipation doctrine presents some interesting issues regarding the bur-
den of proof. In dissipation cases, one recurring factual issue is whether funds
which were admittedly expended by a spouse were spent for a permissible pur-
pose. The relevant facts-when the funds were spent and for what purpose-are
often exclusively within the possession of the spouse who made the expenditure.
If courts follow the general rule that the burden of proof is on the proponent,
and if they therefore place the burden of proof on the spouse claiming dissipa-
tion, it may be difficult for that spouse to establish the purpose for which the
funds were expended.8 9 Even if a spouse is held to have made a prima facie case
by showing that money was expended, a problem may result if the dissipating
spouse makes a general self-serving statement that the expenditures were made
for a proper purpose (e.g., living expenses) that the other spouse cannot disprove
because of lack of access to the information involved. Although it is true that a
court is free to disbelieve testimony of the spouse who made the expenditures, 0
there are cases in which it appears that a court perhaps too readily accepted
such testimony.91 Many Illinois decisions have adopted a special rule for dis-
sipation cases: The person charged with dissipation is under an obligation to
establish by clear and specific evidence how the funds were spent; general and
vague statements that the funds were expended for marital expenses are not
adequate.92 Other courts have similarly placed the burden of proof on the
spouse charged with dissipation.93
87. See In re Marriage of O'Neill, 185 Ill. App. 3d 566, 570, 541 N.E.2d 828, 831 (1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 138 I1. 2d 487, 563 N.E.2d 494 ("the nondissipating spouse may acquiesce in conduct that dissipates
assets for various reasons, including family harmony. The dissipation may still be a factor to consider in dividing
the family assets.").
88. See infra text accompanying notes 160-62.
89. See Gaston v. Gaston, 608 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
90. For examples where courts disbelieved the explanation offerred by the dissipating spouse, see In re Mar-
riage of Lord, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 465 N.E.2d 151, 154 (1984); Dove v. Dove, 773 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989); Bland v. Bland, 652 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); In re Marriage of Hunter, 196 Mont.
235, 240-42, 639 P.2d 489, 491-92 (1982). Cf. Semasek v. Semasek, 509 Pa. 282, 290-91, 502 A.2d 109, 113
(1985) (spouse's testimony regarding the disposition of funds for, inter alia, living expenses was not precise and
the factfinder was not required to consider it).
91. See Howerton v. Howerton, 796 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Gaston v. Gaston, 608 S.W.2d
332, 335 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980); Dean v. Dean, 87 Wis. 2d 854, 869-70, 275 N.W.2d 902, 908 (1979). Cf. In re
Marriage of Lippert, 192 Mont. 222, 227-28, 627 P.2d 1206, 1208-09 (1981) (trial court disbelieved spouse's
testimony that he had lost $96,000 in marital funds in a bad business venture; appellate court reversed, apparently
disregarding the trial court's holding on this factual issue).
92. The seminal decision is In re Marriage of Smith, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1022, 471 N.E.2d 1008, 1013
(1984). Smith has been cited many times. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Westcott, 163 Ill. App. 3d 168, 175, 516
N.E.2d 566, 570 (1987); In re Marriage of Partyka, 158 It. App. 3d 545, 550, 511 N.E.2d 676, 680 (1987); In re
Marriage of Petrovich, 154 Ill. App. 3d 881, 886, 507 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1987); In re Marriage of Los, 136 Ill.
App. 3d 26, 32-33, 482 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (1985).
93. See Manaker v. Manaker, I I Conn. App. 653, 659, 528 A.2d 1170, 1173 (1987); Clements v. Clements,
10 Va. App. 580, 586, 397 S.E. 257, 261 (1990). Cf. In re Marriage of Merry, 213 Mont. 141, 150-51, 689 P.2d
1250, 1254-55 (1984).
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B. The "Marital Property" Analysis
Some decisions do not use a dissipation analysis94 in situations where a
spouse has expended or transferred property that would have been subject to
equitable distribution. Instead the issue as presented in such cases is simply
whether the transferred or disposed of property is to be regarded as subject to
equitable distribution. Many of the specific legal questions that have been con-
sidered in connection with the dissipation doctrine also arise under this ap-
proach, which I will call the "marital property" approach. For example, deci-
sions using a marital property approach have had to determine whether living
expenses or similar expenses of a spouse or the children of the parties are a
permissible expenditure,96 whether an expenditure that takes place prior to mar-
ital breakdown can be the subject of judicial action,97 whether a spouse or a
third party owned funds in dispute,98 and whether a spouse in an equitable dis-
tribution proceeding should be debited to the extent of a loan99 or a gift100 by
that spouse to a third party.
Analysis of questions such as these would seem to present the same issues
whether or not the term "dissipation" is used as part of the analytical structure.
It might, therefore, seem immaterial as to whether a particular jurisdiction fol-
lows a "dissipation" or a "marital property" approach. However, decisions that
94. The term "dissipation analysis" is used herein to refer to decisions that deal with a claim of diminution
of property subject to equitable distribution and which use the term "dissipation" or similar terminology.
95. See. e.g., Bolling v. Bolling, 768 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Dove v. Dove, 773 S.W.2d 871,
874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Bland v. Bland, 652 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Barnhart v. Barnhart, 343
Pa. Super. 234, 239-40, 494 A.2d 443, 445-46 (1985); Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
See also, infra, decisions cited in notes 96-100.
96. As examples of cases holding that a spouse's use of funds for the spouse's living expenses was proper, see
Doyle v. Doyle, 786 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Fornachon v. Fornachon, 748 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988); In re Marriage of Layton, 687 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). For prior discussion of this
issue in connection with the dissipation doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
97. See Cooksey v. Cooksey, 280 S.C. 347, 351-52, 312 S.E.2d 581, 584-85 (Ct. App. 1984) (trial court
erred in refusing to consider, on the ground that the parties were living together and had not separated at the time
of the transfers, one spouse's contention that the other spouse had secreted jointly owned marital funds in antici-
pation of divorce). For prior discussion of this issue in connection with the dissipation doctrine, see supra text
accompanying notes 39-54.
98. See Estep v. Estep, 326 Pa. Super. 404, 417, 474 A.2d 302, 309 (1984) (rejecting spouse's claim that
funds he withdrew from parties' safe deposit box belonged to a third party). See also, not using the dissipation
doctrine in connection with this issue, In re Marriage of Los, 136 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31-32, 482 N.E.2d 1022, 1025-
26 (1985) (at the time of separation, wife sent her parents $10,000 from a bank account in the joint names of
herself and her mother; husband contended that the funds in the account had been deposited by wife from her
earnings, and that, therefore, dissipation had occurred of funds subject to equitable distribution; court found that
the source of the funds in the account was wife's mother's earnings and other funds derived from wife's parents).
99. See Nedblake v. Nedblake, 682 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (loan by spouse to his son during
marriage funded in part from jointly owned property held distributable as marital property). See also Dean v.
Dean, 87 Wis. 2d 854, 867-69, 275 N.W.2d 902, 908 (1979) (repayment by spouse of obligation to his mother
upheld, as against other spouse's contention that the transaction was fraudulent). For prior discussion of the issue
of loans, loan repayments, and debts in connection with the dissipation doctrine, see supra text accompanying
notes 82-85.
100. See Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1055 (Alaska 1987) (if both spouses do not join in making a gift
of property to a third party during the marriage, that gift is voidable at the option of the nonparticipating spouse).
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 132-33; Van Wyk v. Van Wyk, 86 Wis. 2d 100, 114-15, 271 N.W.2d
860, 866 (1978) (wedding gift of $5,000 by spouse to his eldest daughter during divorce was not marital property
because the spouses had previously given a S5,000 wedding gift to son). For prior discussion of this issue in
connection with the dissipation doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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use a marital property approach often simply utilize an ad hoc approach to the
particular question before the court, without any attempt to develop a general
analytical framework to be utilized in cases involving diminution of assets sub-
ject to equitable distribution.10' Such an ad hoc approach affords little basis for
guiding subsequent judicial development of the law, and can lead to confu-
sion." 2 The point being made, however, is not that use of the marital property
approach will necessarily produce confusion and poorly reasoned decisions, nor
that use of the dissipation doctrine will necessarily produce a satisfactory result.
Indeed, the dissipation doctrine has not always produced predictability, and
none of the approaches that use the term "dissipation" is completely satisfac-
tory insofar as the overall breadth of the doctrine is concerned. However, a
jurisdiction that consistently uses the dissipation terminology has a better
chance of developing a consistent approach to the myriad of issues that can
arise in connection with a claim of diminution of marital funds. Courts in such
a jurisdiction are more likely to cumulatively and constructively build on prior
precedent. Moreover, there is a better chance for crossfertilization among juris-
dictions if the jurisdictions are using the same terminology. 0 3
Additionally, the ad hoc marital property approach may not permit the
flexibility that the dissipation approach permits. For example, under the dissipa-
tion approach the court has the power to consider the existence of dissipation as
a factor in dividing what remains, and the court does not necessarily have to
treat the dissipated property as being in existence. However, under the "marital
property" approach, if the property in question is marital property, then pre-
sumably a court would not have the power to consider the dissipating conduct
as a factor, and the only remedy would be that in all instances the property
would be deemed part of the "pot" available for equitable distribution.10 4
101. See, e.g., Ahlo v. Ahlo, I Haw. App. 324, 329, 619 P.2d 112, 117 (1980); Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d
78, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
102. E.g., compare Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1055 (Alaska 1987) (if both spouses do not join in
making a gift of property to a third party during the marriage, that gift is voidable at the option of the nonpartici-
pating spouse; dissipation analysis not used) with Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 802 (Alaska 1989) (until the
marriage ceases to operate as a financial unit, each party has the right to manage and control marital funds);
compare Gruver v. Gruver, 372 Pa. Super. 194, 200, 539 A.2d 395, appeal denied, 520 Pa. 605, 553 A.2d 968
(1988) (refusal to sign joint return held to have resulted in dissipation of marital property; no discussion of
authority) with Hunsinger v. Hunsinger, 381 Pa. Super. 453, 464-65, 554 A.2d 89, 95 (1989) (spouse not entitled
to credit for higher tax payment caused by other spouse's refusal to file joint tax return; term "dissipation" not
used).
103. For example, the Illinois cases have been cited and have contributed to the development of the dissipa-
tion doctrine in Maryland and Virginia. See Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md. App. 386, 401-02, 473 A.2d 499, 506-07,
cert. denied, 300 Md. 795, 481 A.2d 240 (1984); Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 27, 371 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1988).
See also Clements v. Clements, 10 Va. App. 580, 586-87, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990) (discussing decisions in
various jurisdictions).
104. See, e.g., Ahlo, I Haw. App. at 329, 619 P.2d at 117 (not using the "dissipation" terminology and
holding that the property in question should be treated as marital property and debited to the spouse making the
expenditures in question); Missouri decisions cited supra note 12.
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III. THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY MODEL
While in a common law state a spouse has no ownership interest in prop-
erty acquired by and kept in the name of the other spouse,10 5 in a community
property state each spouse has a present equal ownership interest in community
property as it is acquired by either spouse during the marriage.108 In order to
protect each spouse's present ownership interest in community property, and in
view of the general rule that gives each spouse an equal right to manage and
control at least the community personal property,107 community property states
have adopted various statutory provisions that restrict the right of a spouse to
freely deal with community property.10 Thus, statutory provisions commonly
restrict the ability of a spouse to make a gratuitous transfer of community prop-
erty, 0 9 to make any unilateral disposition of certain kinds of community per-
sonal property," 0 or to dispose of community assets that constitute a busi-
105. The fact that in common law states property acquired by a spouse may be subject to equitable distribu-
tion upon divorce is not the equivalent of an ownership interest during the marriage.
106. See. e.g., CAL CiV. CODE § 5105 (West 1983); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (West 1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 123.225(l) (Michie 1986). See also Peters v. Skalman, 27 Wash. App. 247, 257, 617 P.2d 448, 452
(1980).
In general, community property consists of property acquired by either spouse during the marriage, with
certain exceptions (e.g., property acquired by a spouse prior to marriage or by gift or inheritance). Property that is
not community property is generally designated as "separate" property. For a general discussion of community
property systems, see W. MCCLANAHAN. COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (Law. Co-op.
1982); R. MENNELL & T. BOYKOFF. COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988); Pagano, The Charac-
terization and Division of Community Property, in I VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY §8
20.01-20.07 (J. MeCahey ed. 1990).
107. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(B) (1976); CAL CIV. CODE § 5125(a) (West Supp. 1990); IDAHO
CODE § 32-912 (1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (West 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230 (Michie
1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-14(A) (1989); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(c) (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.16.030 (1986).
In some community property states, statutory provisions preserve sole managerial rights for a spouse with
respect to certain property. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-14(B)(1) (1989) (where only one spouse is named
in a document evidencing ownership of community personal property, only that spouse may manage or control the
property); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a) (Vernon 1975) (spouse has the exclusive right to control or manage
the community property that he or she would have owned if single).
108. Such statutory protection may be necessary in various situations. For example, the spouse who acquired
property that is community property may attempt to deal with that property in a way that is harmful to the
ownership interest of the other spouse in that property. Moreover, a spouse who acquires property that is commu-
nity property should be protected against acts of mismanagement by the other spouse (to the extent that the other
spouse has rights of management) with respect to that property.
109. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(b) (West Supp. 1990) (no gift of community personal property with-
out the written consent of the other spouse); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2349 (West 1985) (donation of community
property to a third person requires the concurrence of the spouses, but a spouse acting alone may make a usual or
customary gift of a value commensurate with the economic position of the spouses at the time of the donation);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230(2) (Michie 1986) (neither spouse may make a gift of community property
without the express or implied consent of the other spouse); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030(2) (1986)
(neither spouse may make a gift of community property without the express or implied consent of the other
spouse).
110. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(c) (West Supp. 1990) ("A spouse may not sell, convey, or encumber
community personal property used as the family dwelling, or the furniture, furnishings or fittings of the home, or
the clothing or wearing apparel of the other spouse or minor children which is community property, without the
written consent of the other spouse."); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (West 1985) (concurrence of both spouses is
required for the alienation of community furniture or furnishings while located in the family home); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 123.230(5) (Michie 1986) (neither spouse may sell community household goods, furnishings or
appliances unless the other spouse joins in executing the contract of sale, if any); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
1991] PROPERTY DISSIPATION
ness.111 Failure to comply with these statutory restrictions may be immediately
enforceable." 2 In addition to these statutory provisions, some statutory provi-
sions impose a general duty of care with respect to the management of commu-
nity property." 3
The protection afforded by such statutes is more extensive than the protec-
tion afforded by the dissipation doctrine. For example, statutes that restrict the
right of a spouse to make any transfer of certain types of community property
seem designed to protect the other spouse from being deprived of essentials. The
restriction operates whatever the purpose of the expenditure-even an expendi-
ture for marital purposes is prohibited by these statutes. Moreover, the protec-
tion afforded by such statutes, unlike the protection afforded by the dissipation
doctrine, is available outside a divorce proceeding.
It is, of course, not surprising that community property states extend sig-
nificant protection to each spouse's ownership interest in community property,
and that such protection is more extensive than the protection afforded by the
dissipation doctrine. However, notwithstanding the existence of this protective
system, the dissipation doctrine or a cognate may exist and serve a significant
purpose in community property states. Thus, where a community property state
permits equitable distribution of property, 4 it is helpful for a court to be able
26.16.030(5) (1986) (neither spouse may sell community household goods, furnishings or appliances unless the
other spouse joins in executing the contract of sale, if any).
I l. See, e.g., CAL CIv. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1990) (a spouse who is operating a business that is
community personal property has the primary management and control, but must give prior written notice to the
other spouse of any disposition of all or substantially all of the personal property used in the operation of the
business); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2347 (concurrence of both spouses is required for the alienation of all or
substantially all of the assets of a community enterprise), 2352 (a spouse who is a partner has the exclusive right
to manage the partnership interest) (West 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230(6) (neither spouse may sell
assets of a business without the consent of the other where both spouses participate in its management) (Michie
1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030(6) (1986) (neither spouse may sell assets of a business without the
consent of the other where both spouses participate in its management).
112. See CAL CIv. CODE § 5125.1 (West Supp. 1990); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2353 (West 1985) (aliena-
tion of community property without the consent of the other spouse, where such consent is required by law, is a
"relative nullity").
113. CAL CIV. CODE § 5125(e) (West Supp. 1990) provides as follows:
Each spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other spouse in the management and control of the
community property in accordance with the general rules which control the actions of persons having
relationships of personal confidence. . . until such time as the property has been divided by the parties or
by a court. This duty includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of the existence of
[community] assets. . . and [community] debts. . . upon request.. . . In no event shall this standard be
interpreted to be less than that of good faith in confidential relations . ...
See also LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (West 1985) (a spouse is liable for any loss caused by fraud or bad faith
in the management of community property).
Case law similarly may impose a fiduciary duty. See Spruill v. Spruill, 624 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. Ct. App.
1981) (a trust relationship exists between the spouses as to community property controlled by each spouse, and a
presumption of constructive fraud arises when a spouse unfairly disposes of the other spouse's one-half interest in
community property: the burden of proof is on the disposing spouse to prove the fairness of the disposition of the
other spouse's one-half ownership interest); In re Marriage of Matson, 107 Wash. 2d 479, 484, 730 P.2d 668, 671
(1986) (the demise of the rule that husband was the sole manager of community property in favor of the equal
manager concept has not resulted in the demise of the fiduciary duty; instead, the duty is gender neutral); Peters
v. Skalman, 27 Wash. App. 247, 251, 617 P.2d 448, 452 (1980) (spouses owe each other the highest fiduciary
duties).
114, Of the eight community property states, only Washington permits equitable distribution of both commu-
nity and noncommunity property. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1990). Arizona and Nevada permit
equitable distribution of both community property and a limited class of separate property. See ARiZ. REV. STAT.
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to consider, in making equitable distribution, dissipation or diminution of dis-
tributable property. At least some community property states clearly permit a
court to do so.115 If a court does not have the power to consider dissipation or
diminution of assets, a spouse might be forced to litigate issues of diminution by
bringing an independent action under the protective statutes referred to above.
Because separate suits involve additional cost and delay, the alternative is not a
desirable one. Indeed, California, which does not permit equitable distribution
of community or separate property,"8e permits a court to make a monetary
award from a party's share of community property if there has been deliberate
misappropriation 1 7
The judicial decisions in community property states that deal with the dis-
sipation or dimunition of assets subject to equitable distribution generally in-
volve questions of whether a particular expenditure constitutes dissipation or
diminution. Such decisions generally seem to mirror decisions in common law
states. For example, it has been held that a court making equitable distribution
may consider the expenditure of community funds on gambling or extramarital
sexual affairs"18 or excessive drinking.1 9 Courts also have held that a spouse is
not chargeable for funds lost in business operations if the operations were con-
ducted in good faith,120 and that gifts by a spouse of community property may,
ANN. § 25-318(A) (Supp. 1989) (permitting equitable distribution of both community property and joint tenancy
and other property held in common); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.150(l)(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1989) (permitting
equitable distribution of community property and property placed in joint tenancy after July 12, 1979). Idaho and
Texas permit equitable distribution of community property but not separate property. See IDAHO CODE § 32-712
(1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1990), as interpreted in Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554
S.W.2d 137, 139-42 (Tex. 1977) and Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 213-20 (Tex. 1982). California does
not permit equitable division but only permits equal division of community property and division of some types of
separate property. See CAL CIv. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1990) (community estate of the parties is to be
divided equally); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.4(a) (West Supp. 1990) (court may, in a proceeding for division of
community property, divide the separate property interests of the parties in real or personal property held by them
as joint tenants or tenants in common). The New Mexico and Louisiana statutes both seem to indicate that
community property is to be equally divided. See W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 106, at 531 (Law. Co-op. 1982);
R. MENNELL & T. BOYKOFF, supra note 106, at 324-26 (2d ed. 1988); W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 292 (2d ed. 1982).
115. Thus, the Texas cases clearly support the right of a court to consider one spouse's diminution of commu-
nity property in making equitable distribution of community property. See, e.g., Rafidi v. Rafidi, 718 S.W.2d 43,
45-46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Arrington v. Arrington, 613
S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). For similar law in other states, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318(A)
(Supp. 1989) and Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 456, 752 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1988); In re Marriage of Clark. 13
Wash. App. 805, 808-09, 538 P.2d 145, 147 (1975).
116. See supra note 114.
117. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990) ("court may award from a party's share any sum
it determines to have been deliberately misappropriated by such party to the exclusion of the interest of the other
party in the community estate").
118. See, e.g., Morrison v. Morrison, 713 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Spruill v. Spruill, 624
S.W.2d 694, 697-98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
119. See In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wash. App. at 808-09, 538 P.2d at 146-47.
120. See Andrews v. Andrews, 677 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (a spouse's good faith but unwise
investments of community funds resulting in losses to the community estate do not justify an unequal distribution
of the remaining community property); Peters v. Skalman, 27 Wash. App. 247, 251, 617 P.2d 448, 452 (1980)
(losses as well as gains which result from the managing spouse's activities flow to the community, absent a show-
ing of bad faith). Cf. In re Marriage of Schultz, 105 Cal. App. 3d 846, 855, 164 Cal. Rptr. 653, 660 (1980)
(negligent mishandling of community finances and negligence in incurring of debt not encompassed by statute
which permits unequal awards for "deliberate misappropriation").
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even in the absence of a statutory prohibition against such gifts, constitute im-
permissible dissipation or diminution of community property.121 Judicial deci-
sions in community property states do not discuss whether conduct resulting in
the diminution of assets may be the subject of judicial action where such con-
duct occurred prior to marital breakdown. Presumably, the dissipation doctrine
or its cognate-to the extent that such a doctrine exists in a community prop-
erty state-encompasses any dissipation of community property, whether the
conduct occurred before or after marital breakdown, because any such dissipa-
tion interferes with a present ownership interest of the other spouse.,22
Courts in common law states must carefully consider the extent to which
judicial decisions and statutes in community property jurisdictions are suffi-
ciently analogous to be relied upon. The outstanding difference between com-
munity property and common law states is that in community property states a
spouse has a present ownership interest in community property, whereas in com-
mon law states each spouse is free during the marriage to acquire and to own
property to the exclusion of any ownership interest of the other spouse. This
fundamental difference in the system of property ownership may well result in
differential treatment of some dissipation claims. For example, the difference as
to ownership may affect the law regarding the basic applicability of a dissipa-
tion or diminution doctrine. That is, as has been previously mentioned, no com-
munity property state appears to have developed a marital breakdown require-
ment, probably because of the fact that a dissipation of community property
even prior to marital breakdown is still an interference with a present ownership
interest of the other spouse. This difference in ownership systems may also re-
sult in differing results regarding whether a particular expenditure or particular
conduct constitutes dissipation or diminution. For example, the difference would
seem insignificant in analyzing whether gambling losses constitute dissipation or
diminution. On the other hand, a common law state, in determining the extent
to which the dissipation doctrine encompasses a gift made by a spouse from
funds acquired by and held solely in the name of that spouse, must keep in
mind and carefully evaluate the effect of the fundamental difference in owner-
ship before relying on statutes or case law doctrine in community property
states that prohibit a gift by one spouse of community property.2 3
121. See Simpson v. Simpson, 679 S.W.2d 39,42 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Spruill, 624 S.W.2d at 697; Reaney,
505 S.W.2d at 340.
122. The question of the scope of the dissipation doctrine could arise where a community property state
permits equitable distribution of noncommunity property. In such a case, the spouse claiming dissipation would
have no ownership interest in the noncommunity property. Therefore, a question could arise as to whether the
dissipation doctrine applies to dissipation of noncommunity property which occurred prior to the date of marital
breakdown.
123. See infra discussion of Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987), at text accompanying notes
133-35.
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IV. THE UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT MODEL
The Uniform Marital Property Act 124 ("UMPA") provides for a system of
property ownership akin to community property. Each spouse acquires a present
equal ownership interest in property (with certain exceptions) acquired during
the marriage by either spouse,1 25 and each spouse has the right to manage vari-
ous classes of marital property.1 26 The UMPA imposes restrictions on gifts of
marital property to a third party by one spouse,1 27 but does not contain any of
the other restrictions on disposition that exist in some community property
states.12 8 The UMPA does require that each spouse act in good faith in matters
involving marital property and other property of the other spouse.' 29
The UMPA provides for various interspousal remedies, 30 but does not
speak to divorce.' 3' Therefore, the question as to whether dissipation can be
124. 9A U.L.A. 97-145 (1987). To date, the Act has been adopted by only one state, Wisconsin, and then
with substantial modification. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001 to 766.97 (West Supp. 1989).
125. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY AcT § 4(c), 9A U.L.A. 109 (1987). The property in which an ownership
interest is acquired is called "marital property." Certain kinds of property acquired by a spouse during marriage
are excluded from the "marital property" classification. See § 4(g), 9A U.L.A. 109.
126. Section 5(a) of the Act (9A U.L.A. 114 (1987)) gives a spouse, acting alone, the right to manage and
control certain classes of marital property, such as, for example, marital property held in that spouse's name alone
or not held in the name of either spouse (§ 5(a)(2)) and marital property held in the names of both spouses in the
alternative (§ 5(a)(6)). Section 5(b) provides that spouses may manage and control marital property held in the
names of both spouses other than in the alternative only if they act together.
127. Section 6(a) of the Act (9A U.L.A. 116 (1987)) provides:
A spouse acting alone may give to a third person marital property that the spouse has the right to manage
and control only if the value . . . does not aggregate more than [$500] in a calendar year, or a larger
amount if, when made, the gift is reasonable in amount considering the economic position of the spouses.
Any other gift of marital property to a third person is subject to subsection (b) [which provides for a right
to recover the property or a compensatory judgment in the event of a violation of subsection (a)] unless
both spouses act together in making the gift.
In Wisconsin, which has adopted a modified version of the UMPA, the limit on the amount of gifts that a spouse
can give in a calendar year is $1,000. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.53 (West Supp. 1989). Otherwise, and with the
exception of some additional matter, Wisconsin's statute retains the above provisions of § 6(a) of the Act.
128. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
129. Section 2(a) of the Act (9A U.L.A. 107 (1987)) provides:
Each spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other spouse in matters involving marital property
or other property of the other spouse. This obligation may not be varied by a marital property agreement.
The Comment to § 2(a) states:
Spouses are not trustees or guarantors toward each other. Neither are they simple parties to a contract.
A spouse is not bound always to succeed in matters involving marital property ventures, but while
endeavoring to succeed in a venture, must proceed with an appropriate regard for the property interests of
the other spouse and without taking unfair advantage of the other spouse.
9A U.L.A. 107 (1987).
130. See § 15, 9A U.L.A. 132-33 (1987). The Comment to § 15 states, inter alia:
Since the Act creates respective vested interests in marital property while still permitting individual man-
agement and control of that property, there is an obvious possibility that management and control rights
could be exercised in a way that damages or eliminates the interest of the spouse who does not hold the
property. This section creates a remedy for this type of conduct. An important purpose of the section is
creation of a remedy for a violation of the good faith responsibility between spouses required by Section 2.
I . * t also affords a remedy for violations of specific provisions contained throughout the Act.
9A U.L.A. 133 (1987).
13 1. Thus, the Prefatory Note to the Act states: "The Act takes the parties 'to the door of the divorce court'
only. It leaves to existing dissolution procedures in the several states the selection of the appropriate procedures for
dividing property." 9A U.L.A. 100 (1987).
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considered in an equitable distribution hearing is not addressed by the Act.'32
As in the case of community property precedent, a common law state must
carefully determine whether the UMPA's provisions restricting the ability of a
spouse to deal with marital property are sufficiently analogous to be useful in
analyzing questions connected with the dissipation doctrine. For example, in
Brooks v. Brooks,"' the court adopted the approach of the UMPA with respect
to a gift by a spouse of funds that were apparently otherwise subject to equita-
ble distribution. The court noted:
The UMPA approach [i.e., § 6(a) of the Act] to analyzing gifts made by one spouse
during the marriage is persuasive. It supplies a logical, sound rule of easy application.
It also accords ample protection against any surreptitious actions.""
The court did not consider the difference in the system of property ownership
between Alaska, which is a common law jurisdiction, and the UMPA, under
which each spouse acquires a present ownership interest in marital property.
The fact that under the UMPA a spouse has an ownership interest in property
given away by the other spouse certainly justifies the Act's restrictions. How-
ever, the reasoning that supports the UMPA's restrictions may be inapplicable
to a common law state's rule regarding gifts. 135
V. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
Conduct of a spouse that constitutes dissipation or diminution of assets
subject to equitable distribution not only reduces the amount of assets available
for equitable distribution but is also relevant in evaluating the contributions
made by the spouses with respect to the marriage and its economic success.
Therefore, even if a state statute does not specifically mandate that dissipation
be considered as a factor in making equitable distribution," 6 such statutes may
easily-and, because of the fundamental soundness of the dissipation doc-
trine, 137 should be-interpreted to provide that dissipation may be considered as
such a factor. Moreover, although statutory language does not usually specifi-
cally authorize the offset approach when a court is faced with dissipating con-
duct, 138 the offset approach is, in essence, simply a variant of the general rule
permitting dissipation to be considered as a factor in making equitable distribu-
tion; as such, a court should have the power to utilize the offset approach where
appropriate. Whether a court can make a compensatory award where sufficient
assets do not exist will depend upon the interpretation of particular statutory
132. In view of the silence of the Act concerning property division upon divorce, any state which adopts the
UMPA must independently determine the method of property distribution to be utilized upon divorce. In Wiscon-
sin, WIs STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981). which predates the UMPA and which authorizes equitable property
division upon divorce, governs. See Mausing v. Mausing, 146 Wis. 2d 92, 99, 429 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1988);
Kuhlman v. Kuhlman, 146 Wis. 2d 588, 590-93, 432 N.W.2d 295, 297 (Ct. App. 1988).
133. 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987).
134. Id. at 1055.
135. See discussion infra in Part V. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS.
136. See supra notes 14-15.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
138. See supra text accompanying note 12 (discussing the offset approach).
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language."3 9 However, if the language of the governing statute is not viewed as
controlling on this question, equitable considerations seem to weigh heavily in
favor of permitting such an award.1 40
The question of the scope of the dissipation doctrine presents more difficult
issues. The disagreement that exists among the various jurisdictions is simply
about the extent of the protection to be afforded to a spouse's interest in prop-
erty that is subject to equitable distribution. There is no disagreement about the
fundamental principle that such an interest should be subject to at least some
degree of protection.' 41 I believe that the dissipation doctrine should extend
maximum protection to this interest and should therefore be applicable to any
expenditure or other conduct that diminishes or adversely affects funds availa-
ble for equitable distribution, no matter when such expenditure or conduct oc-
curred. I therefore reject, as applicable standards, both the law making the dis-
sipation doctrine applicable only where the conduct in question has occurred
after marital breakdown1 42 and the case law holding (or suggesting) that the
dissipation doctrine is applicable only where the conduct in question has been
engaged in with intent to deprive the other party of rights in equitable property
distribution. 143 The question that jurisdictions must face is whether either of the
two standards that restrict the scope of the dissipation doctrine is preferable to
an unrestricted standard.
Of the two restrictive standards, the marital breakdown requirement ap-
pears to be the one that has been relied upon the most. However, few decisions
discuss the rationale for that limitation. One suggested rationale is that the lim-
itation is necessary in order to avoid courts being asked to "audit" failed mar-
riages, the suggestion being that once a marriage has failed a party will then
utilize the dissipation doctrine to question all expenditures and other conduct of
139. See supra note 13.
140. A court needs the power to enter such an award so as to be able to deal adequately with the problem of
the spouse who secrets property subject to equitable distribution. For example, if a spouse is successful in secreting
property, the other spouse may not be able to prove the existence of such property. If the dissipating spouse has
successfully secreted the great majority of the property subject to equitable distribution so that the other spouse is
unable to prove that any of the property is in existence at the time of equitable distribution, a court which lacks
the power to enter a compensatory award may be helpless to protect the innocent spouse. Thus, requiring a spouse
to prove the existence of the dissipated funds as a prerequisite for an award may have the effect of rewarding a
dissipating spouse who secrets the property in such a way that it cannot be found. Moreover, even if the funds are
in fact no longer in existence, it is unfair to permit a spouse's own dissipation of funds to insulate that spouse from
liability to the other spouse where no other marital funds remain.
141. For example, the marital breakdown requirement does extend protection against dissipating conduct
which occurs after marital breakdown, regardless of whether the assets involved were acquired before or after the
breakdown and regardless of whether one or both spouses "owned" the assets as long as the assets were subject to
equitable distribution.
It may be noted that the dissipation doctrine is not unique in extending protection to an interest in property
subject to equitable distribution even though the interest is not an ownership interest. Thus, statutes in common
law states not uncommonly do confer protection against a spouse's dealing with such property after matrimonial
litigation has been commenced. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 403(a) (Purdon Supp. 1990) (court may
issue an injunction to prevent removal of property from the jurisdiction or to prevent disposition, alienation, or
encumbrance of property in order to defeat equitable distribution).
142. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
143. See supra decisions cited at note 55.
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the other spouse, no matter when such expenditures or conduct occurred.144 Pre-
sumably, the concern is that a spouse may utilize the dissipation doctrine to
harass the other spouse by making frivolous claims. A further concern is that
the defendant spouse will have more difficulty rebutting a claim of dissipation
that relates to the time period when the parties were living together because the
spouse would not be "on guard" and would, therefore, be less prepared to rebut
the charge. 4
5
However, this rationale is not convincing. First, although the nonrestrictive
standard that I espouse will no doubt result in claims of dissipation based on
conduct that predated any marital breakdown, such claims of dissipation need
not necessarily present more difficult questions for the court, and in any event
courts are competent to decide whatever disputed questions of fact are
presented. More importantly, it must be remembered that the marital break-
down requirement bars all claims of dissipation that predate breakdown, no
matter how egregious the conduct and even if such conduct constitutes conver-
sion by one spouse of property jointly owned by both spouses. This absolute
insulation of conduct occurring prior to marital breakdown seems inconsistent
both with statutory provisions which, without imposing any time constraints,
authorize a court to consider dissipation,14 and with the protection that prior
law afforded to jointly owned funds. 47 In any event this insulation of dissipation
occurring prior to marital breakdown is unwise in view of the purposes that
equitable distribution is designed to serve. Given the existence of wrongdo-
ing-i.e., dissipation-the reasons that have been advanced for differential
treatment of the wrongdoing based on the time of its occurrence seem, in es-
sence, to be based more on judicial convenience than on substance. Thus, the
144. See In re Marriage of Getautas, 189 Ill. App. 3d 148, 154-55, 544 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (1989). Cf.
Panhorst v. Panhorst, 390 S.E.2d 376, 379 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
145. Getautas, 189 II1. App. 3d at 154-55, 544 N.E.2d at 1288. The court in Getautas was also influenced by
the interaction between the burden of proof rules in Illinois in dissipation cases and the marital breakdown re-
quirement. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
146. See supra notes 14 and 15 for a listing of the various statutory provisions. But see In re Marriage of
O'Neill, 138 III. 487, 563 N.E.2d 494 (1990) (construing the Illinois statute as containing a marital breakdown
requirement).
147. Prior to equitable distribution, case law protected a spouse in situations where the other spouse con-
verted joint assets or used joint assets for his sole benefit, even if the spouses were living together at the time of
the conversion. See, e.g., Feltz v. Pavlik, 257 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315
Pa. 225. 227-28. 173 A. 172, 173 (1934). (By way of analogy, note that case law also protected a spouse against
actions of the other spouse in transferring property, even while the spouses were still living together, in order to
defeat the alimony rights of a spouse or the rights of a spouse to take an elective share in the estate of the
transferring spouse. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 583 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (husband cannot
make a voluntary transfer of real or personal property with the intent of preventing his wife from sharing in such
property at his death); see generally W. MACDONALD, supra note 57.)
One does not know how much of this older case law continues to survive the adoption of equitable distribu-
tion. It is possible that this older case law survives intact. It may therefore be argued that the limitation placed on
the dissipation doctrine by the breakdown test is not harmful because the older remedies that existed prior to
equitable distribution remedies remain available. However, even if the older remedies remain available, relegating
a spouse to these remedies is inadequate because the wrong-the dissipation-should be capable of being dealt
with in an equitable distribution proceeding. It would be unfair to the wronged spouse to require a vindication to
be sought in a proceeding separate and apart from a divorce proceeding. Such a requirement can only lead to
complications, delay, and further unnecessary expense. (Remember also that state law often permits an award to a
needy spouse of attorney's fees in connection with divorce litigation; it is unlikely that state law would give a court
the power to make such an award in a separate lawsuit to vindicate a spouse's property rights.)
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rationale offered for the marital breakdown requirement is unconvincing. 148
Moreover, as previously discussed, determining the time of marital breakdown
may be difficult and may impose an unfair burden of proof on the nondissipat-
ing spouse. 149 It also should be carefully noted that the nonrestrictive standard
which I espouse does not in effect amount to judicial adoption of community
property principles. Fundamental differences would still exist between my stan-
dard and community property, in that even under an unrestricted standard a
spouse has no ownership rights, and hence no right of management or control,
of property owned by the other spouse. Moreover, the nonrestrictive standard
confers no enforceable rights during the marriage: Rights exist only in connec-
tion with equitable distribution.
In addition to the marital breakdown requirement, the other standard that
restricts the scope of the dissipation doctrine is the anticipation of divorce stan-
dard. Under this test, the dissipation doctrine applies when property has been
intentionally dissipated with a view to divorce to defeat the other spouse's equi-
table distribution rights. For reasons that have been discussed previously, 50 this
standard is not a satisfactory one.
In addition to the disagreement among the courts regarding the scope of
the dissipation doctrine, disagreement also exists regarding the type of expendi-
tures that constitute dissipation. One step that might prove helpful would be to
adopt a general standard, one that would control in the absence of more specific
rules, regarding whether expenditures constitute dissipation. Although common
law states generally have not adopted such a standard, such a standard could be
useful in resolving some of the questions that have arisen. For example, a gen-
eral good faith duty, similar to that which exists under the California statute15'
and the UMPA25 1 might be helpful in resolving questions that have arisen re-
garding whether losses in business transactions constitute dissipation. 53
However, although a general standard might be useful in resolving some
questions, other questions require more specific rules. For example, a bona fide
gift by a spouse to a third party (e.g., a relative) of funds owned by that spouse
but still subject to equitable distribution is arguably consistent with a good faith
requirement, even if given without the consent of the other spouse, in the ab-
sence of any other specific rule. However, decisions in common law states have
tended to treat such gifts as dissipation or diminution,15 4 regardless of whether
the gift was derived from jointly owned or individually owned funds and regard-
less of the identity of the recipient of the gift (e.g., regardless of whether the
recipient of the gift was a paramour or the spouse's child). Unfortunately, how-
148. It may be suggested that the marital breakdown requirement is a way of protecting the traditional right
of a spouse to do as she pleases with her property. See Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 371 S.E.2d 569 (1988).
However, even that requirement recognizes the propriety of interference with a spouse's exercise of his ownership
rights over even individually owned property where such conduct occurs after marital breakdown and where under
state law the property involved would be subject to equitable distribution.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
151. See supra note 113.
152. See supra note 129.
153. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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ever, the decisions generally have not included any extensive analysis of the
issue. Where jointly owned funds are concerned, the law in community property
states and under the UMPA is analogous. This line of analogous authority fur-
nishes two different approaches, either requiring the consent of the other
spouse 55 or permitting a spouse, acting alone, to make a gift that falls within
certain dollar limitations or is reasonable under the economic circumstances of
the parties.156 Of these two approaches, requiring the consent of the other
spouse is the most protective and seems appropriate in view of the other spouse's
ownership interest in the property. Where individually owned funds are con-
cerned, however, the community property experience is less relevant. In that
situation, there is more of a need in a common law state to accommodate the
ownership interest of the donor spouse and, therefore, an approach that permits
a gift that is reasonable under the circumstances seems appropriate. Even here,
however, one may question whether a gift by a spouse to a paramour can ever
constitute a reasonable gift.157
Another problem that is not easily resolved by the application of a general
fiduciary duty standard and which has provoked some disagreement among the
courts involves the extent to which expenditures loosely categorized as "living
expenses," including reasonable living expenses, constitute dissipation. 158 Such
expenditures, if made from individually owned funds, should not constitute dis-
sipation even though the individually owned funds are subject to equitable dis-
tribution, because the expending spouse must be able to appropriately support
himself. Such expenditures for support do not unduly infringe on the economic
rights of the other spouse. Permissible expenditures could include those for rent,
furniture and furnishings, reasonable vacations, and other similar usual living
expenses. In all cases the basic governing rule should be that the expenses be
reasonable under the circumstances and in view of the lifestyle of the parties
while they were living together as husband and wife. The same analysis gener-
ally should be followed where expenditures are made for reasonable living ex-
penses with jointly owned funds. There is, however, one substantial caveat in
the case of expenditures from jointly owned funds. If the spouse making such an
expenditure does have individually owned funds, and if the spouse derives an
unfair benefit from the use of the jointly owned funds for personal living ex-
penses, then the expenditures should constitute dissipation.
155. See supra note 109 (California, Nevada, and Washington statutes).
156. As has been mentioned previously, Louisiana, a community property jurisdiction, permits a spouse act-
ing alone to make a usual or customary gift of community property of a value commensurate with the economic
position of the spouses at the time of the donation. See supra note 109. Wisconsin, following the provisions of the
UMPA, permits a spouse to make a gift of marital property which falls within certain dollar limits or which is
reasonable in amount considering the economic position of the spouses. See supra note 127.
157. I am not aware of any decision which discusses whether such a gift is reasonable under state law per-
mitting a reasonable gift. Certainly, however, decisions have held that such a gift constitutes reimbursable dissipa-
tion or diminution. See, e.g., Morrison v. Morrison, 713 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). One could argue,
with some degree of force, that such a gift is so inconsistent with the marital relationship, at least while the
spouses are living together, that such a gift should be per se unreasonable. It is possible that such a gift could be
precluded under statutory language that, like the Louisiana statute described earlier, permits a "usual or custom-
ary" gift.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 66-75.
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As a general proposition, an expenditure of funds by one spouse for the
reasonable living expenses of the other spouse or of the children of the parties
should not constitute dissipation. Again, however, certain specific circumstances
require a more complex analysis. Thus, where one spouse's use of jointly owned
funds to pay for living expenses of the other spouse or of the children of the
parties would create an unfair benefit for the payor spouse, such payments may
be viewed as constituting dissipation. For example, if the expenditures are made
to satisfy an obligation created by a court support order, then the order should
be viewed as making the ordered payments an individual obligation, and, there-
fore, the spouse should not be able to use jointly owned funds as a source of the
ordered payments. However, the use of separately owned funds to comply with
a court support order seems unobjectionable, even if the separately owned funds
are subject to equitable distribution, because there is no other alternative.
Even where no court order is outstanding, a spouse who uses jointly owned
funds to pay for living expenses of the family may run into the contention that
the use of jointly owned funds confers an undue benefit and therefore consti-
tutes dissipation. For example, assume that an economically independent spouse
who would normally bear most of the child and spousal support burden uses
jointly owned funds to pay for familial living expenses, notwithstanding the fact
that that spouse also separately owns funds that are not subject to equitable
distribution. It may well be that such a spouse derives an unfair benefit from
use of the jointly owned funds, and that such use constitutes dissipation.159
The role of consent and acquiescence in dissipation cases is an interesting
and largely undeveloped area of the law. The few decisions on point indicate,
and I think correctly so, that consent given in advance of or contemporaneously
with an expenditure should bar a finding of dissipation.160 The purpose of the
dissipation doctrine is to protect the interest of a spouse and once a spouse has
agreed to an expenditure no reason exists to protect that spouse, assuming com-
petence to make a decision. Moreover, if consent to an expenditure is mani-
fested in advance to an expending spouse, it would be unfair to later hold the
expending spouse responsible under the dissipation doctrine. This consent rule
should include implied as well as express consent. Although an implied consent
defense may present difficult factual issues on occasion, a rule that excluded an
implied consent defense while allowing a defense of express consent could pre-
sent even more difficult factual issues. More importantly, implied consent is
nevertheless consent and should be recognized as such. Note, however, that if
consent in advance is a defense, then protest (i.e., the manifestation of objection
159. See supra note 78 (discussion of Grandovic v. Grandovic).
Note, however, that in this situation, a spouse with separately owned funds in a state where such funds arc
not subject to equitable distribution may be placed in a difficult dilemma. If the spouse uses marital assets to pay
the living expenses, the spouse can be charged with dissipation of the full amount of the expenditure; but if the
spouse uses individually owned funds that are not subject to equitable distribution, the spouse may lose any chance
at reimbursement from the other spouse if the other spouse has a partial responsibility for payment of the cx-
penses in question (e.g., college expenses for the children of the parties).
160. See supra discussion at note 86.
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rather than consent 61) in advance of an expenditure negates any contention of
consent. The mere presence of protest, however, does not establish per se
dissipation.
So far as I am aware, no decisions to date have focused on whether follow-
ing an expenditure there can be a defense based on ratification or acquiescence
by a spouse who did not have knowledge prior to the expenditure. 6 2 A concept
of ratification or acquiescence would present interesting issues of definition. For
example, would mere knowledge of an expenditure and failure to protest consti-
tute acquiescence, or would some positive manifestation of consent be neces-
sary? Although it is a close question, I would not allow such a defense. First, it
is difficult to determine at what point ratification or acquiescence would occur.
For example, if spouses continue to live together after knowledge by the inno-
cent spouse, will ratification be found? Is a mere protest after the expenditure
sufficient to preserve the rights of the protesting spouse? If so, why? What ac-
tual purpose-other than satisfaction of a legal construct-is served by the pro-
test? Second, no unfairness to the spending spouse results from denying such a
defense, and there can be no possible reliance argument, because the expendi-
ture has already occurred.
The burden of proof in dissipation cases deserves some analysis. As dis-
cussed supra, judicial decisions in some states utilize a rule that shifts the bur-
den of proof in dissipation cases.' 63 The Illinois rule can serve a useful purpose
by avoiding an interpretation of the usual rules regarding the burden of proof
that would require the spouse claiming dissipation to prove precisely what dis-
position the other spouse made of the funds in question, even where the funds
were under the exclusive control of the spouse who made the expenditures in
question. However, the rule may be too broad if applied to every charge of
dissipation. Rather, the rule shifting the burden of proof should only be applied
where the other spouse makes out a prima facie case of dissipation by showing
unexplained and unconsented to expenditures of funds that would have been
subject to equitable distribution. (Where, under state law, the dissipation doc-
trine contains a marital breakdown requirement or similar limitation, then,
under usual burden of proof concepts, the spouse charging dissipation must also
prove that such requirement has been met. However, imposing such a burden of
proof on the spouse charging dissipation seems unfair because the relevant facts,
161. The line between a refusal to consent and a mere questioning of the wisdom of an expenditure may be
difficult to draw, but courts are competent to resolve such questions.
162. Cf. the Legislative Council Committee Supplemental Notes to Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.53 (Supp. 1989),
which statute essentially follows § 6(a) of the UMPA's approach in restricting gifts by one spouse of marital
property. (The Wisconsin and Uniform Act provisions are discussed in more detail supra at note 127.) These notes
apparently recognize the existence of ratification following a gift that would have otherwise been prohibited. The
Legislative Council Committee Supplemental Notes to § 766.53 state:
Questions have been raised concerning the requirement that, for certain gifts of marital property, s.
766.53 requires the spouses to "act together." In reviewing and revising the gift rule, the special commit-
tee concluded that the rule does not require spouses to act simultaneously to be considered to be acting
together; subsequent conduct by the other spouse is sufficient. It is assumed that common law doctrines
regarding consent, such as estoppel and ratification, apply.
163. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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such as the precise time at which the expenditures were made, are often within
the exclusive knowledge of the spouse who made the expenditures.)
It may be objected that the rule shifting the burden of proof is unfair be-
cause a spouse spending funds that would be subject to equitable distribution
must, in order to protect herself, make records of all such expenditures that are
made from funds subject to equitable distribution. (In a variation of this argu-
ment, in In re Marriage of Getautas'6 it was contended that the marital break-
down requirement was necessary because otherwise a spouse would at the time
of trial have the burden of proving that expenditures at any time during the
marriage did not constitute dissipation. 65) However, the burden of proof is
shifted only where a prima facie case has been made. If the spouse charging
dissipation has not proven the unexplained and unconsented to expenditure of
funds, then there is a failure to prove a prima facie case. Moreover, in evaluat-
ing the evidence offered by an allegedly dissipating spouse it should be clear
that failure to record the transaction and inability to recall over passage of time
do not necesarily amount to a failure of proof. Instead, testimony of inability to
recall the details of a particular transaction should be carefully weighed in light
of what is recalled, the magnitude of the transaction, and all other relevant
circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
There appears to be ample authority, statutory and case law, in common
law states permitting consideration of dissipation or diminution of assets subject
to equitable distribution as a factor in making equitable distribution. However,
common law states have not otherwise agreed upon or developed a sufficient
analytical structure regarding the problem of dissipation or diminution of such
assets. Thus, this article has pointed out substantial deficiencies in the law of
those states which either require that in order for dissipating conduct to be
considered, the conduct must have occurred after some form of marital break-
down, 66 or which require that the conduct must have been motivated by an
intent to adversely affect the property rights of the other spouse upon divorce.'67
Moreover, there are serious differences about whether basic types of expendi-
tures constitute dissipation. 68 The law as to such a basic area as the effect of
consent or acquiescence also is essentially undeveloped.' 69
This article has suggested an analysis of some of the questions that arise
when dissipation claims are made. In view of the increasing number of cases in
which claims of dissipation or diminution are being made, it is, correspondingly,
increasingly important for courts to develop complete, consistent analyses of this
difficult area of law.
164. 189 I1. App. 3d 148, 544 N.E.2d 1284 (1989).
165. Id. at 154-55, 544 N.E.2d at 1288.
166. See supra discussion at notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
167. See supra discussion at notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
168. See supra discussion at notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
169. See supra discussion at notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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